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Television, Tort Law,
and Federalismt
Robert M. O'Neil*
T HE IMPACT OF TELEvISION upon the United States can hardly be
doubted. The impact of tort law upon television has been widely
discussed and often litigated. The impact of federal law upon the state
tort law that creates the broadcaster's liability, however, has largely
been neglected. This article will attempt to explore that impact. Before
considering the strictly legal elements of the problem, those elements
must be placed in perspective. It would be idle to discuss the impact of
federalism at length if the broadcaster had no reason for concern about
tort liability. There seems to be much cause for concern, however,
whether or not the number of such cases has been increasing.1 The cases
have recently been reported are more complex, and potential liability
greater, than previously. At the same time, however, the limiting effects
of federal law upon state tort claims in this area are increasingly ap-
parent. It is the interaction between these two trends that forms the
basic of this article.
The intriguingly tortious potential of television may best be illustrated
through several recent cases. They serve to illustrate two points that
that are of critical importance here: First, tort law has not kept pace
with the changing character of television and with the variety of situa-
tions that may lead to private litigation; and second, in part a conse-
quence of the first, the results of the cases have varied widely from one
state to another and even between courts within a single state.
Both difficulties are reflected in a jumble of cases that came in the
wake of quiz show scandals. Shortly after the truth about "rigged" quiz
t The author is indebted to Mr. Frederick F. Gregory, a member of the third year
class at Boalt Hall, for careful background research on some of the problems discussed
here, and for many constructive and helpful suggestions.
* A.B., 1956, A.M., 1957, LL.B., 1961, Harvard University; Acting Associate Professor
of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1 Undoubtedly the number of reported suits against broadcasters has recently increased,
as the cases cited herein will indicate. Spokesmen for the industry do not appear, however,
to be concerned about any statistical increase in the volume of such litigation. Letter from
Reginald Geiser, Esq., Assistant Vice President, Employers Reinsurance Corp. (a major
writer of broadcast defamation insurance) to the Author, March 4, 1965; Letter from
Mortimer Weinbach, Vice President, American Broadcasting Co., to the Author, March 26,
1965; Letter from Ralph E. Goldberg, Law Department, Columbia Broadcasting System,
to the Author, April 12, 1965. Yet there appears to have been sufficient concern to renew
efforts in Congress for enactment of a law which would give broadcasters extensive im-
munities from state defamation law. See Broadcasting, March 8, 1965, p. 5.
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programs came to light in 1958 and 1959, a number of lawsuits were
filed by innocent contestants who had been duped, and whose reputations
had suffered by their early defeats at the hands of primed "experts."
The gist of these complaints, apparently, was that the plaintiffs' were
either made to look stupid to the viewing public, or that the impression
had been created they were somehow tied in with the crooked scheme-
all of which had enriched the sponsor and the producer and the network
but not the plaintiff.2 The heart of the cases, then, was a claim that
sounded very much like defamation. In the past the law of libel and
slander had generally been able to accommodate novel ways of tarnish-
ing an innocent man's reputation, whether out of malice or simply for
sport. But in the quiz show cases, the New York courts have been and
still are struggling to evolve a workable theory of defamation.
One trial court dismissed the whole idea on the ground that the def-
amation, if any, occurred not when the plaintiff appeared on the pro-
gram but only when the truth was revealed, so that there was nothing
in the broadcasts themselves which even resort to extrinsic facts would
render defamatory.' Other courts were a bit bolder. Two judges sug-
gested, for example, that there might be recovery if the plaintiff could
show special damages, but without explaining just how this claim differed
in law from the ordinary libel claim for which an allegation of general
damage would suffice.4 Only twice have these questions even gone to the
Appellate Division,5 and never, apparently, to the New York Court of
Appeals. 6
2 See, e.g., Morrison v. NBC, 40 Misc. 2d 876, 243 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
Some of the suits also alleged breaches of implied contracts, but those claims were disposed
of on traditional grounds.
8 E.g., Goldberg v. CBS, 25 Misc. 2d 129, 205 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
4 Morrison v. NBC, 40 Misc. 2d 876, 243 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Clark v. NBC,
28 Misc. 876, 243 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
5 Holt v. CBS, 22 App. Div. 2d 791, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1964); Clark v. NBC, 11 App.
Div. 2d 642, 203 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1960).
6 For other phases of this litigation, all in the New York courts, see Friedlander v.
NBC, 39 Misc. 2d 612, 241 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Clark v. NBC, 22 Misc. 2d 319,
195 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd mem., 11 App. Div. 2d 642, 203 N.Y.S.2d 1009
(1960); Davidson v. NBC, 26 Misc. 2d 936, 204 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Goostree v.
P. Lorillard Co., 26 Misc. 2d 109, 202 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Although most of
these suits were filed in 1958 or 1959, reference to the lolt and Friedlander cases indicates
that the litigation has dragged on for several years. Some of these cases, indeed, are still
pending. Most of the plaintiffs sued not only the network, but also the key station of the
network over which the programs originated, the sponsors, the producers, and in at least
one case a contestant whose collusive knowledge of the correct answers contributed to the
plaintiff's humiliation. In none of the reported decisions has the allocation of liability
among these various defendants been considered.
The quiz show scandals had interesting repercussions and ramifications. For a lively
expos6 of the episode, see WMnBERG, TV 3N A.m =CA: T3 MoRALrrY op HARD CAS3n 1-155
(1962). Thorough congressional investigation of the quiz show scandal led to rigorous
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The quiz show cases point out how difficult have been the recent
problems in the field of defamation by television. At the same time there
has been a good deal of activity in the invasion of privacy field, in direc-
tions which seem novel and potentially dangerous for the unwary broad-
caster. At its inception the right to privacy afforded rather modest pro-
tections.' Recently, however, there have been successful suits based upon
the use of a name,8 or bits of a biography,9 or even indirectly disclosed
identityl°--not only for purposes of entertainment through drama or
comedy, but even in the form of news reports. Perhaps most startling is
a recent New York case enjoining, as an invasion of privacy, an un-
consented account of the plaintiff's career less than twenty-four hours
before the scheduled broadcast time."
Novel interactions of tort law and television have occurred in other
fields as well. We might consider for a moment the illustrative case of
Bert Lahr and the voice of the talking duck.'" Several years ago the
Adell Chemical Co. commissioned a series of TV cartoon commercials
built around a duck that extolled, with diction quite remarkable for a
duck, the virtues of Adell's Lestoil cleaning compound. The duck's
voice sounded so strikingly like one used by Bert Lahr, the distinguished
legislation designed to prevent a repetition. See § 509 of the Communications Act, added
by 74 Stat. 897 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. V, 1964). The whole experience has had.
interesting side effects also. For example, the FCC recently refused to renew a broadcast
license partly because of involvement of two of the licensee's principals in the quiz shows
several years before. In re Application of Melody Music, Inc., 36 F.C.C. 201 (1964).
7See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1904);
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Haav. L. RPv. 193 (1890); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CAmw. L. REv. 383 (1960).
8 E.g., Fleisher v. WPIX, Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 17, 213 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1961); cf-
Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963).
9 E.g., Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ia. 1964) (unsuc-
cessful action by administratrix of estate of Al Capone, and by his wife and son, for
appropriation of property right of decedent and invasion of privacy by telecasts ["Theo
Untouchables"] about Capone and his activities) ; Strickler v. NBC, 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.
Cal. 1958); Bernstein v. NBC, 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948); Leavy v. Cooney, 214:
Cal. App. 2d 496, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1963); Smith v. NBC, 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 29?
P.2d 600 (1956); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955);
Smith v. WGN, Inc., 47 Ill. App. 2d 183, 197 N.E.2d 482 (1964); Youssoupoff v. CBS, 41
Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 19 App. Div. 2d 869, 244 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1963); Durgom v. CBS, 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
'ONappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963). For a
recent survey of the developing litigation in this field, see generally, FREEDom OF INrORA-
TION CENTER, PUBLICATiON No. 133, TURBULENCE m nr PRivAcY F=i 3-5 (1965).
"Durgom v. CBS, 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1961); cf. Raynor v.
ABC, 222 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1963), in which the court considered but decided on the:
merits against granting an injunction against a scheduled dramatic broadcast.12 Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
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actor and comedian, that many listeners apparently assumed the voice
of the duck was Lahr's. This, he alleged in his complaint against Adell,
misappropriated his "creative talent, voice, vocal sounds and vocal comic
delivery" and thus cheapened his professional standing by suggesting that
he had stooped, or fallen, to the level of making ordinary commercials.
Lahr sought recovery on three legal theories: defamation, invasion of
privacy (or the corollary right of publicity), and unfair competition. Be-
cause of the complexity of the substantive law and the wide circulation
of the commercials, the case might have raised serious conflict of laws
problems, but the parties agreed to resolve their disputes under the laws
of New York and Massachusetts. The district court found no merit in
any of the claims, and dismissed the suit. 8 The court of appeals reversed
unanimously.' 4 Although unimpressed with the privacy claim, and un-
certain about the allegations of unfair competition insufficiently stated in
the complaint, the court concluded that there was a plausible claim of
defamation.' Actors had recovered in the past for insinuations that
they were performing below their class,' 6 and for the moment that was
enough to send the case back for trial.
The remand of the Lahr case left many questions unsettled. But in
its approach to -the defamation claim the court of appeals was more crea-
tive than the British Court of Appeal had been three years earlier. The
British case involved strikingly similar facts. The H. J. Heinz Company
had prepared a series of TV commercials for its products, featuring
the antics of a cartoon character whose voice sounded enticingly like that
of the actor Alastair Sim. Actually the voice was not Sim's at all but
was that of an actor who had often mimicked Sire in the past. Upon
learning of the commercials, Sim protested to the sponsor and, receiving
no satisfaction, went to court for an injunction and damages. The Court
of Appeal held only that there was no ground for a preliminary injunc-
13Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1961). The district court
characterized the plaintiff's theory of recovery as a "label-less, anonymous tort" which
did not even deserve serious consideration. Id. at 704.
14 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
15 By remanding the case on the defamation ground, the court avoided the immediate
necessity to rule upon the unfair competition claim. In dictum, however, the court sug-
gested that the plaintiff had alleged a colorable case of passing off, since "it could well be
found that defendant's conduct saturated plaintiff's audience to the point of curtailing his
market." Even though no claim of copyright protection could be demonstrated, the state
law of unfair competition might nevertheless protect "a peculiar style and type of per-
formance" of an entertainer. Id. at 259. For further consideration of these questions, and
of the possible impact of recent Supreme Court decisions, see text accompanying notes 246-
73 infra.
16 See, e.g., Louka v. Park Entertainments, Inc., 294 Mass. 268, 1 N.E.2d 41 (1936);
cf. Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods., Inc., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937).
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tion.17 The opinion hinted, however, a view of the defamation claim less
generous to the plaintiff than that of the Lahr court. On the other hand
the British court was apparently more impressed than were the Ameri-
can judges by the charge of unfair competition.
Enough has now been said to indicate that tortious activity on tele-
vision has become increasingly complicated. 8 The simpler and more
familiar defamation suits have been joined by newer claims involving
invasion of privacy and unfair competition. This brief survey of recent
litigation compels an inquiry into the origins of the broadcaster's tort
liability. That inquiry spans a period of almost forty years and covers
myriad cases in the United States and abroad.
I
LEGAL BASIS OF THE BROADCASTER'S TORT LIABILITY
The development of the broadcaster's liability for defamation and re-
lated torts has taken place in three stages. During the first period, the
1930's, the law was strict and the broadcaster's liability all but absolute.
The end of the thirties saw a relaxation of these rigorous standards. In
the next decade both courts and legislatures spoke more in terms of
"due care" than of "strict liability." Finally, with the advent of tele-
vision in the 1950's there has come a third phase, a partial revival of the
strict liability principle, but tempered by important exceptions and
qualifications.
Although there was at least one unreported British case long before
17 Sim v. H. J. Heinz Co., [19591 1 All. E.R. 547 (CA.). For a discussion of this
case, and analysis of the underlying issues, see Comment, 39 CAN. B. Rv. 409 (1961).
18 For a representative selection of recent cases involving defamation by radio and
television, see, e.g., Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1962); Wanamaker v. Lewis,
173 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1959); Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957),
aff'd, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958); Sargent v. NBC, 136 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Cal. 1955);
Correia v. Santos, 191 Cal. App. 2d 844, 13 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1961); Charles Parker Co. v.
Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955); American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962); Kennedy
v. Mid-Continent Telecasting Co., 193 Kan. 544, 394 P.2d 400 (1964); Deshotel v. Thistle-
thwalte, 240 La. 12, 121 So. 2d 222 (1960) ; Fontenot v. Fontenot, 235 La. 488, 104 So. 2d
431 (1958); Niehoff v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 149 Me. 412, 103 A.2d 219 (1954);
Young v. New Mexico Broadcasting Co., 60 N.M. 475, 292 P.2d 776 (1956); James v.
Powell, 20 App. Div. 2d 689, 246 N.Y.S.2d 998, aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 881, 200 N.E.2d 772,
252 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1965); Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. NBC,
17 Misc. 2d 208, 186 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd mem., 10 App. Div. 2d 607, 197
N.Y.S.2d 413 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961);
Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co., 256 N.C. 382, 124 SYE.2d 98 (1962); Holden v. Pioneer
Broadcasting Co., 228 Ore. 405, 365 P.2d 845 (1961) ; Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 411 Pa. 167, 191 A.2d 662 (1963); Seegars v. WIS-TV, 236 S.C. 355, 114 S.E.2d 502
(1960); Gibler v. Houston Post Co., 310 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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1930,19 the history of the broadcaster's liability in the English speaking
countries really dates from 1932. In that year two seminal cases were
decided, one in Nebraska20 and the other in Victoria, Australia.2
Although the facts were similar, the two courts took radically differ-
ent views of the legal issues. The American court, conscious that it was
writing new law upon a clean slate, first determined that the defamatory
words, though spoken rather than written, constituted "libel" rather than
"slander." In addition, the broadcaster was considered liable regardless
of fault because he occupied the position of a publisher rather than that
of a distributor of the defamation. The Australian court, by contrast, held
that spoken defamation, whether over the air or by an unaided voice,
was still slander. The consequences of this distinction were of course
critical: Libel was usually actionable without proof of special damages,
while only certain narrow categories of slander would support a claim
for general damages.22 Thus the success of the plaintiff's case would often
depend upon whether the defamation was classed as libel or slander.
For the next few years, the American courts generally followed the
Nebraska decision classifying radio defamation as libel and holding the
broadcaster strictly accountable as a "publisher."2 These criteria pro-
duced harsh results where, for example, the defamatory broadcast ori-
ginated at the network studio and was carried locally by a small station
that had no chance to check it before it went over the air.24 The rule was
also inequitable in the case of certain political broadcasts which the
"equal-time" provision of the Communications Act25 (or its predecessor
in the Radio Act of 192720) compelled the broadcaster to carry.27 Un-
derstandably, then, there was much discussion of the wisdom of these
principles of law, but they were seldom relaxed by the courts during the
early days of commercial radio.
The inequity and unworkability of the Nebraska rule were not fully
apparent until the courts were required to deal with the problem of de-
19 Williams & Norgate, Ltd. v. BBC, noted in 70 SoL. J. 613 (1926), styled by the
commentator "the first slander case to have arisen out of the broadcasting of defamatory
matter ... ." The brief notation of the case contains no reference to the court's conclusion
or any other matters concerning the case. See also 99 CEN1T. L.J. 204 (1926).
20 Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
2 1 Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., [1932] Vict. L.R. 425, [1932] Aust. L.R.
452.
22 See generally PRossER, ToRTs 769-83 (3d ed. 1964).
2 3 See, e.g., Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
2 4 See, e.g., Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
25 § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. V, 1964).
26 Federal Radio Act, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170 (1927).
27 Compare Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), with Josephson v.
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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famatory interpolations. In the first major "ad lib" case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in 1939 broke with tradition and absolved the broad-
caster because there had been no showing of failure to exercise due care.28
Absolute liability, declared this court, was both unnecessary and danger-
ous. Its application here might not only jeopardize federal regulation of
the industry but might unwisely stifle free discussion.29 In addition, the
absolute liability standard was inequitable, and seemingly incompatible
with the general development of tort law.30
During the 1940's and early 1950's two trends appeared: The courts
increasingly adopted the Pennsylvania rule of liability only for negli-
gence, whether they classified radio defamation as libel or slander; and
state legislatures were active in the adoption of statutes freeing the broad-
caster of all liability under certain conditions and recognizing the due
care standard in other situations."- A few of these state laws immunized
the affiliated local station for defamatory broadcasts originating at the
network's key stations. Several statutes distinguished between defamation
spoken by a member of the station's staff, for which the broadcaster re-
mained absolutely liable, and by one not in the broadcaster's employ.82
Several of these state laws prescribed the type of damages that could be
awarded, for example restricting the plaintiff to recovery of "actual
damages."3
The last and current stage of this legal development has coincided with
the age of commercial television. Most of the recent cases involve TV
28 Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939). It should be noted
that the Pennsylvania courts would not, apparently, have held even a newspaper or maga-
zine publisher absolutely liable for the dissemination of such defamatory material. Thus
the decision may have been less of a break with tradition than the result might at first
suggest. See Note, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 122, 124 (1939).
29 See 336 Pa. at 200-03, 8 A.2d at 310-11.
SO Id. at 202, 8 A.2d at 311. The court may also have been influenced by the reluctance
of the American Law Institute's recently issued Restatement of Torts to take any position
on this question. The Institute's caveat refusing to resolve the issue either way was, the
court observed, adopted "after full discussion, on the ground that the decided radio cases
were insufficient in number to require the acceptance of an analogy presenting such serious
practical and legal difficulties." id. at 195, 8 A.2d at 308. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 577,
comment g (1934).
31For discussion and examples of early state legislation conferring partial privileges or
immunities upon the broadcaster, see generally Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in
Defamation by Radio, 64 HMAv. L. REv. 727, 739-46 (1951); Sprague, More Freedom of
the Air, 11 Am L. Rxv. 17, 25-28 (1940); 1 J. RADIo LAw 572, 576-78 (1931). The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, among others, proposed in the 1930's an exemption for broad-
casters from liability based upon material which the federal equal-time law compelled them
to carry. See Sprague, Freedom of the Air, 8 Am L. RFv. 30, 44 (1937).
32 See generally Remmers, supra note 31, at 740-42; for examples of the many varia-
tions of this general formula of absolution, see statutes cited note 81 infra.
33 See Remmers, supra note 31, at 745.
19651
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53: 421
programs, for radio is infrequently a source of major tort litigation.
Also, the cases no longer involve exclusively defamation, as the examples
already cited may suggest. Invasion of privacy has become more im-
portant during the last decade, and defamation less.
A. The Legal Issues, Old and New
This field of law, then, is rich and becoming progressively richer. The
wonder is that so little has been written about it of late. During the 1930's
and early forties the situation was precisely the reverse of what it has
been in the fifties and sixties. For every decided case there were a dozen
articles, notes and comments 4 As the pace of litigation quickened, how-
ever, the stream of scholarly comment practically ceased. What was once
a torrent of discussion and analysis in the legal journals is now only a
trickle5 This curious inverse ratio of cases to comment requires explana-
tion.
Perhaps the best key to the paradox is that those who wrote in the
early days of radio exhausted themselves on the wrong issues. Their gaze
was fixed on two questions that were not central and have become progres-
sively even less relevant: The distinction between libel and slander (which
category included radio defamation?); and the difference between the
84 It would be futile to attempt a comprehensive list of the materials from the early
period. A representative selection, however, might include Davis, Libel and Slander by Radio,
34 CASE & COM[ENT 67 (1928); Farnum, Radio Defamation and the American Law Insti-
tute, 16 B.U.L. Rav. 1 (1936); Finlay, Defamation by Radio, 19 CAN. B. Rav. 353 (1941);
Haley, The Law on Radio Programs, 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 157, 171-97 (1937); Redmond,
Reading from Script into Broadcasting Apparatus-Libel or Slander, 7 AusmT. L.J. 257
(1933); Royce, Defamation via Radio, 1 Onto ST. L.J. 180 (1935); Seitz, Responsibility
of Radio Stations for Extemporaneous Defamation, 24 MARQ. L. R-y. 117 (1940); Void,
The Basis for Liability for Defanution by Radio, 19 MIN. L. Ray. 611 (1935); Vold,
Defamation by Radio, 2 J. RADIO LAW 673 (1932); Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in
Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 249 (1940); and many dozen notes, comments, and
casenotes on the principal cases decided during these early years.
35AAmong the rather small number of recent articles, all dealing with television as well
as radio defamation and related torts, are Barry, Radio, Television and the Law of Dafama-
tion, 23 AusmI. LJ. 203 (1949); Harum, Choice of Law in Broadcast Defamation, 38 FLA.
B.J. 266 (1964); Harum, Federal Occupation of Political Defamation, 49 A.B.A.J. 1096
(1963); Harum, Remolding of Common Law Defamation, 49 A.B.A.J. 149 (1963); Korbel,
Defamation by Broadcast: The Need for Federal Control, 49 A.B.AJ. 771 (1963); Leflar,
Radio and TV Defamation: "Fault" or Strict Liability?, 15 Omo ST. L.J. 252 (1954);
Reid, Broadcast Defamation, 30 SouTExu¢ SPEacH J. 199 (1965); Warner, Multistate
Publication in Radio and Television, 23 LAW & CONTKvy. PiOB. 14 (1958). One recent
case, American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126
S.E.2d 873 (1962), elicited a considerable response from the journals in the form of case-
notes. See, e.g., 12 A.m. U.L. Rav. 222 (1963); 25 GA. B.J. 310 (1963); 1 HOUSTOr L. REV.
58 (1963); 46 AIARQ. L. Rav. 397 (1962-63); 36 Tam,. L.Q. 240 (1963); 37 TuL. L. REV.
147 (1962); 16 VMW. L. Rav. 472 (1963); 9 WAYNE L. REV. 391 (1963). Few of the other
recent decisions seem, however, to have provoked more than a sporadic casenote or foot-
note in a comment or note dealing with a related issue.
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liability of a publisher and that of a distributor (which of these was
the radio broadcaster?). The preoccupation with these questions, based
on the hasty assumption that they were the relevant questions, may have
been largely responsible both for the withdrawal of the commentators
from this field at a time when their guidance has been most needed, and
for the inapplicability of much of the early learning to the difficult new
problems of television. In fairness, then, we ought to explore these two
pervasive questions.
1. The Libel-Slander Distinction
The law of defamation assumed its present character in a day when
broadcasting and even sound amplification were unknown3 6 The legally
significant distinction between libel and slander has always rested on
history rather than logic. Over the years it has withstood reasoned attacks
by worthy critics.3r Seldom has the distinction been completely abolished
except by legislative fiat, and even that has been rarely done.3" Yet
through it all, most scholars have insisted that the distinction makes little
sense even in the simplest cases.39
Whatever may be said generally for the libel-slander dichotomy, it is
peculiarly inapplicable to radio and television.4 ° Specifically, the results
of a literal application of this distinction to broadcasting are often not
those which a rational and just legal system should produce. It always
86 See generally Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,
41 L.Q. Rxv. 13 (1925); Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law,
15 VAND. L. Rxv. 1051 (1962); Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation,
4 CoLtmtd. L. Rnv. 33 (1904).
3 7 One of the earliest and most forceful, critics, was Lord Mansfield, in Thorley v.
Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812).
3 8 Apparently no American states have taken so bold a step by statute, although one
or two have done so by judicial decision. Statutes assimilating libel and slander have, how-
ever, been adopted by several Australian states and Canadian provinces. See FLmimG,
TORTS 488 & nn.37-39 (2d ed. 1961). In England, despite the recommendation of a select
Committee of the House of Lords in 1843, this step has never yet been taken. The libel-
slander distinction was partially eradicated by the Defamation Act of 1952, but not wholly.
See Statutes, 16 MOD. L. REv. 198, 201 (1953).
39 Dean Prosser's pungent criticism is representative: "Nothing but historical survival
of the relics of forgotten jurisdictional conflicts accounts for a state of affairs peculiar to
the common law, and unknown elsewhere in the civilized world. Nowhere is the layman's
criticism and the cry, 'kill all the lawyers first,' more thoroughly justified. Undoubtedly
the ingenuity of the judge and good sense of the jury often will introduce some degree
of flexibility, but more often they are quite helpless before rigid and arbitrary categories."
PROSSER, ToRas 783 (3d ed. 1964). See also, e.g., Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of
Slander and Libel, 36 Am. L. Rlv. 552 (1902); Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Pro-
posals for Reform, 33 MwNr. L. R.Pv. 609 (1949).
40 See, e.g., Leflar, Radio and TV Defamation: "Fault" or Strict Liability?, 15 Oao
ST. L.. 252, 253 (1954); Comment, 1957 WAsir. U.L.Q. 282, 289; Note, Basis of Liability
in Radio Defamation, 29 B.U.L. R v. 245, 247 (1949).
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seemed monstrous, for example, to deny recovery to one who has been
falsely called a Communist over the air because he was able to show
neither "special damages" nor actual disparagement of his professional
qualifications. Yet that was precisely the consequence of a rigid, instinc-
tive application of the law, for defamation by radio was "spoken"
rather than "written."'" To relax the categories in order to reach an ob-
viously more just result would, of course, flout four centuries of history.
The legal meaning of the difference between "writing" and "speaking"
had deep roots.
Even the more creative courts could reach a sounder conclusion in
such cases only by forcing radio defamation into the "libel" category.42
This was done by marshalling several more or less strained analogies.
There was, for example, a thin but respectable line of English cases hold-
ing that the reading of a defamatory letter was libel rather than slander.4"
These cases did not, however, really answer the problem for at least three
reasons: First, because their foundation, never firm, bad been sharply
questioned by a high British court;44 second, because the central distinc-
tion in these cases rested on the logically irrelevant factor of whether the
defamation was read from a script;45 and finally because the very signifi-
cance of having read the defamation from a letter-that reading apprised
the listener that the defamation had a more permanent form-was
meaningless when, as on the air, the listener could not see the speaker.40
This analogy, then, was weak justification for reaching an obviously pref-
erable result.
There were other ways of making the libel-slander distinction turn on
permanence of form rather than on the written-spoken issue. Some courts
drew by analogy upon cases classifying motion picture sound tracks as
libel.47 But these cases were little more helpful than the letter-reading
cases since they really applied only when the program was recorded be-
fore or during presentation. To be sure, recording made it possible to re-
41 See Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 875, 888-89 (1956).
42 See, e.g., Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947); cf. Charles
Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
43Forrester v. Tyrrell, 9 Times L.R. 257 (1893); John Lamb's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 59b
(1610); De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125a (1605).
4 4 Osborn v. Thomas Boulter & Son, [1930) 2 K.B. 226, 231 (CA.).
45 See Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 300-03, 73 N.E.2d 30, 32-33 (1947) (Fuld,
J., concurring).
46 See American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230,
236, 126 S.E.2d 873, 877 (1962).
4 7 E.g., Landau v. CBS, 205 Misc. 357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954). But cf.
Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166, 169 (S).N.Y. 1949), an early television case in
which the sound movie analogy was rejected. For the sound movie doctrine, see Brown v.
Paramount Publix Corp., 240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y. Supp. 544 (1934).
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peat the defamation, a fact critical in classifying the movie sound
tracks. Where the recording was made for the network's or the station's
own files, however, and never replayed on the air, that factor should
not have influenced a choice which traditionally rested on the greater
damage which defamatory material might do in permanent form.4"
Other courts classified the defamatory broadcast as libel because it
involved the kind of "deliberation" that was characteristic of libellous
writings. 49 Deliberation there undoubtedly was in the case of the defama-
tory script, but this was irrelevant to the much harder case of the defama-
tory ad lib. Here there could hardly be said to have been any deliberation,
either on the part of the speaker or of the broadcaster (who usually
claimed to be at least as surprised as the plaintiff). Yet the defamatory
ad lib was quite as capable of doing serious injury to reputation as was
a libellous script.
A few courts and commentators invoked a principle which resolved
the issue, but without reasons: Traditionally, novel forms of injury to
reputation had been treated as libel rather than as slander.50 The only
reason given for this trend was a feeling that the scope of slander should
be narrowed wherever possible because of its inequities, inconsistencies,
and difficulties of proof. The trouble was, however, that radio defamation
was not really novel in kind (and was therefore unlike the other cases
to which the "novelty" principle had been applied)51 but only in degree.
Thus even this arbitrary basis of distinction did not satisfactorily re-
solve the issue.
Gradually attention focussed on more relevant attributes of radio
defamation, which raised questions of policy rather than purely of prec-
edent. The difference between the speech to a small group and the address
to a radio audience of millions was admittedly only one of degree. That
difference, however, was so vast that principles developed in the days of
drawing-room inuendoes simply no longer applied. This did not mean
that the defamatory broadcast was precisely like anything that had pre-
4 8 See Note, 71 HARv. L. REV. 384 (1957).
49 See Note, Damages for Defamation by Radio, 25 Cm.-KEaN L. lv. 142, 147 (1947);
Void, Defamation by Radio, 2 J. RADio LAw 673, 690-92 (1932); 3 Am L. Rv. 64, 67
(1932).
50 See Haley, The Law on Radio Programs, 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 157, 184-85 (1937);
81 U. PA. L. RLv. 228, 229 (1932).
5 1 The law of libel has, for example, been extended to include such unlikely injuries
to reputation as those involved in statues, Monson v. Tussauds, [1894] 1 Q.B. 671; hanging
the plaintiff in effigy, Eyre v. Garlick, 42 J.P. 68 (1878); dishonoring a check validly drawn
on the defendant's bank, Svendsen v. State Bank of Duluth, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086
(1896); and "shadowing" or following the plaintiff in an obvious and embarrassing fashion,
Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386
(1913).
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viously been regarded as libel, but rather reflected a frank recognition
that the attempt to find the closest factual analogy had largely missed
the point. Eventually, the legal issue was resolved, or in some cases
avoided, on grounds of public policy, but this came about after years of
tilting at a legal windmill that would not budge.
2. Standard of the Broadcaster's Liability
The other question that preoccupied the experts during the early
years was that of the broadcaster's liability: Should he be liable regard-
less of fault, or only for the absence of due care? If he were considered
to be a "publisher," then strict liability would be appropriate, as for
other publishers.2 If, on the other hand, he were only a disseminator,
with the speaker regarded as the publisher, a due care standard would
be more suitable." The issue was debated endlessly in the literature with-
out satisfactory resolution in the courts. 4 Again the debate revolved
largely about a set of analogies that did not quite fit. Meanwhile the more
pertinent policy issues were slighted.
Broadcasters sought exemption from the publisher's liability by con-
tending, for example, that they should be given a privilege or immunity
like that long enjoyed by telegraph companies.5 There were, however,
some rather obvious differences between the two media: First, the tele-
graph company was under a common carrier's duty to transmit almost
anything that came across the counter;5 second, the transmission process
was virtually automatic, affording little opportunity for inspection of
each message; 57 third, to require such inspection would seriously inhibit
a communication medium to which speed, accuracy, and some degree of
confidentiality are obviously vital. Moreover, the cryptic language fre-
quently used in telegraphy presumably made it difficult to detect all but
the most obviously defamatory material. Thus the telegrapher has never
been expected to catch and withhold from the wires the few fragments
52 See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920).
53 Various persons who play only a secondary part in the dissemination of defamation
that has been published by another are held liable only for lack of due care. Such persons
include news vendors, Balabanoff v. Fossani, 192 Misc. 615, 81 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct.
1948); distributors of periodicals, Sexton v. American News Co., 133 F. Supp. 591 (N.D.
Fla. 1955); and libraries, Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library, [1900] 2 Q.B. 170.
54 See the discussion of the analogy, and the materials cited in Summit Hotel Co. v.
NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 192-95, 8 A.2d 302, 307-08 & nn.13, 14 (1939).
55 See DAvis, RADiO COmmumcAnoN 116-69 (1928) for the statement of the argument
in favor of the analogy. The telegrapher's liability is fully discussed in Smith, Liability of
a Telegraph Company for Transmitting a Defamatory Message, 20 CoLUM. L. Rev. 30, 369
(1920) ; and cases are collected in Annot., 63 A.L.R. 1118 (1929).
56 See Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio, 19 MiNx. L. lav. 611,
653 (1935).
57 See Finlay, Defamation by Radio, 19 CAw. B. Rav. 353, 366-67 (1941).
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of defamation that may be among the millions of messages he daily trans-
mits.
A proferred analogy to the telephone companies was similarly dis-
missed.58 The telephone operator retained, if anything, somewhat less
control over the individual message than the telegrapher, and detection
of defamation here would require an even deeper intrusion into the pri-
vacy of personal communications. Finally, there has been little support
for the analogy between the broadcaster and the lessor of an auditorium
in which or public address system over which a defamatory speech is
given. 9 The responsibility of such a person for the dissemination of the
injurious message was obviously quite different from that of the radio
broadcaster.
The rejection of these analogies eventually narrowed the choice to two
lines of cases-those involving book, newspaper, and magazine publishers
(whose liability was absolute) and those holding newsdealers, booksellers,
and other distributors only to a standard of due care. On the one hand
it was argued that the broadcaster and the publisher were usually compe-
titors for audience attention and advertising revenue, and engaged in
somewhat similar functions, so they should incur similar liability for in-
juries to reputation. 0 Publisher and broadcaster alike furnished and con-
trolled the facilities which magnified the defamatory statement a thousand-
or million-fold and gave it an instantaneous wide circulation which greatly
magnified the potential for harm. Finally, both could largely shift the
risk of loss through insurance or indemnification.61
These arguments were widely accepted in the case of defamation
broadcast from a script which had been submitted to the broadcaster
for examination. But in the cases of the script that could not be inspected,
or the simultaneous network broadcast, or the defamatory ad lib, the
broadcaster should no more be held strictly accountable, it was argued,
than should the newsdealer be liable for any defamatory charge on the
inside pages of the morning journal. 2 Of course the broadcaster could
and often did instruct his engineers or control room personnel to moni-
tor all broadcasts and cut the speaker off the air if any defamation ap-
peared. But the difficulty with this device was twofold. On the one hand
even the trained libel lawyer could not always judge the defamatory
58 See Note, Television Delamation--Libel or Slander?, 42 VA. L. REv. 63, 68-69 (1956).
69 The analogy was suggested by Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. Rav. 725,
731 (1937). For a reaction to this analogy, see Comment, Libel and Slander-Classification
of Radio Defamation-Liability of Broadcaster, 39 Mica. L. Ray. 1002, 1007 (1941).
60 See Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 357, 243 N.W. 82, 86 (1932).
61 See Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IowA L. Rav. 12, 25
(1948).
62 See Comment, Defamation by Radio, 4 J.BA. KYA. 245, 247 (1936).
19651
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
character of a statement on the spur of the moment, particularly where
the words themselves gave no clue to the injury they conveyed; so much
the less could one expect a radio engineer to make accurate spot judg-
ments. 3 On the other hand many cases involved only a defamatory sen-
tence or two, which was over the air before even the expert lawyer could
react." So in these cases-the simultaneous network broadcast and the
defamatory ad lib-the proponents of absolute liability virtually had to
concede that their position rested on grounds of policy similar to those
that had long governed extra-hazardous activities. 5 There was some-
thing artificial about framing this policy question in terms of the broad-
caster's similarity to the publisher or the bookseller. The debate was
unsatisfactory because neither analogy fit all the cases. Yet this kind of
debate was a virtually inevitable result of the attempt to press a new
medium of communication into an ancient, already archaic, legal frame-
work.
The time and energy devoted to these two questions were, as we have
seen, hardly commensurate with the return. Worse, perhaps, was the re-
sulting withdrawal of attention from the issues that ought to have been
debated and resolved during these years. A quick survey of the most
egregiously neglected questions may corroborate this charge.
Surely there was no aspect of the radio broadcaster's liability more
deserving of special treatment than the impact of the conflict of laws. It
was apparent almost from the beginning that courts would find it neces-
sary to struggle with such questions. The Supreme Court early observed
that "no state lines divide the radio waves."00 The newspapers and other
media had long been plagued by state-to-state variations in defamation
law,67 particularly in the treacherous days before recognition of the single-
publication principle. The broadcaster faced perils equal to those of the
publisher or worse in at least two respects: Not only was the reach of
the radio wave far less predictable and controllable than that of the
book or magazine, but there was the unique problem of the network
broadcast heard simultaneously through local outlets in many states,
63 See Guider, Liability for Defamation in Political Broadcasts, 2 J. RADIO LAW 708,
712 (1932).
64 See Graham, Defamation and Radio, 12 WASH. L. REv. 282, 289 (1937).
65 For a scholarly debate on the appropriateness of this theory of strict liability, com-
pare Seitz, Responsibility of Radio Stations for Extemporaneous Defamation, 24 MARQ. L.
Rxv. 117, 123-25 (1940), with VoId, Extemporaneous Defamation by Radio: A Rejoinder,
25 MARQ. L. Rxv. 57, 61-65 (1941).
66 Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279
(1933).
67 See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Curtis Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940) ; Leflar, The
Single Publication Rule, 25 RocxY MT. L. Rxv. 263 (1953); Prosser, Interstate Publication,
51 Mici. L. REV. 959 (1953).
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which found no real counterpart anywhere in the publishing trade. Even
if the law governing the publisher's interstate liability had been fairly
uniform in the early thirties-which it clearly was not-the broadcaster's
plight deserved some special consideration. Such consideration has been
late in coming, although the subject has now been fully explored else-
where.""
The special problems of network broadcasting were hardly confined
to the conflict of laws. As the first network case made dear, there would
be need for careful consideration and accommodation of the liabilities of
the network, the "key station" originating the offending program, and
the station which carried it. 9 There was an early attempt, for example,
to analogize the local station to the newspaper carrying an actionable
dispatch from the news service wires. Apart from the obvious differences
between the two cases, the results flowing from this analogy were often
at variance with the results dictated by other relevant analogies. For in-
stance, if the originating station was a "publisher" of defamation as
most courts found, then it was hard to avoid the conclusion that the local
station was equally a "publisher." Thus the wire-service analogy simply
gave no satisfactory solution to the network cases.
During the early years only cursory attention was given to the vari-
ous devices available for shifting liability. More than one court eased its
conscience in finding the broadcaster absolutely liable by suggesting that
insurance was always available as a backstop.7° The suggestion was made,
of course, with virtually no information about the extent of insurance
carried by the industry, or even about the availability of adequate cov-
erage at reasonable rates.7 1 These oversights may have been significant
68 See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, CoNmcr or LAWS § 216 (1962); Warner, Mitistate Publi-
cation in Radio and Television, 23 LAW & CONTEiMP. PROs. 14 (1958); Developments in the
Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 950-57 (1956); Comment, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 823
(1962); Comment, 10 LA. L. REv. 339 (1950); Note, 11 OXLA. L. REv. 61 (1958).
09 Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934). This decision,
which held the local station strictly liable for defamation received from the network's wires
and rebroadcast locally, provoked much comment in the journals, most of it critical of the
harshness of the result. See, e.g., 15 B.U.L. REv. 651 (1935); 6 Asa L. REv. 81 (1935); 14
ORE. L. Rav. 492 (1935); 8 So. CAL. L. REv. 359 (1935); 21 VA. L. REV. 705 (1935).
7 0 Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., supra note 69.
7 1 For a discussion of the availability and types of insurance, see generally Donnelly,
The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867, 881 (1948);
Friedenthal & Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HlRv. L. REv. 445, 484 (1959); Leflar, Radio and
TV Defamation: "Fault" or Strict Liability?, 15 OMo ST. LJ. 252, 266 (1954); Develop-
ments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 914-16 (1956). The vice president of
one of the major networks has observed, "practically all broadcasters carry insurance poli-
cies which cover defamation and privacy litigation." Letter from Mortimer Weinbach, Vice
President of American Broadcasting Co., to the Author, March 26, 1965.
The broadcaster can hardly claim he has not been apprised of the importance of carry-
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for one reason not present in the typical case where insurance becomes rel-
evant: While there would be little doubt about the validity of insurance
protection against liability predicated on negligence, there is at least
a question how far insurance may serve to insulate the intentional wrong-
doer. There were, of course, few suggestions that even in the case of def-
amation originating in the defendant's studio, the broadcaster was a
deliberate tortfeasor; indeed, one of the very foundations for strict li-
ability under the "publisher" analogy was a recognition that tortious in-
tent would be hard to prove except in the most outrageous cases.72 In
addition, if the person primarily liable (the speaker or actor, usually)
is judgment-proof, and the insurer's liability accrues as soon as judg-
ment is rendered, which seems usually to be the case, then the insurance
coverage might be sustained simply as a protection of the injured plain-
tiff's right to compensation rather than as a license to the defendant. 8
The questions raised by the application of insurance to broadcasting
were not insoluble; the point is only that they should have been dealt with
more extensively once the courts became concerned about them.
Related to the insurance question was the problem posed by the multi-
plicity of possible defendants. No one doubted that the person who ac-
tually delivered the defamation over the air was liable, and absolutely
so. The hard questions concerned the liability of the other participants
in the enterprise, the producer, director, and even the engineer in the
studio; the sponsor and the advertising agency which prepared at least
the commercial copy and perhaps a good deal of the program content;
the broadcaster, of course; and, it was even suggested at one point, even
the owner of any receiving set which disseminated the offending material. 4
It was occasionally proposed to avoid most of these questions through
some form of indemnification imposing ultimate liability on the party most
ing insurance. A recent advertisement by a leading issuer of broadcast defamation insurance
in a national trade magazine warns:
Here's the Answer to Libel Suits:
One slip of the lip, however accidental, can bring about court action-with you
as the defendant in a libel suit. It can be costly enough to be disastrous. Now you
can hold your loss on any claim to an agreed amount you carry yourself, and let
[the advertiser] . . . handle the excess. This specially designed policy provides
economical protection against losses due to libel, slander, invasion of privacy, pi-
racy, violation of copyright ....
Broadcasting, April 19, 1965, p. 26.
72 This logical difficulty was avoided by some advocates of absolute liability by point-
ing out that the broadcaster was at least a knowing and deliberate participant in the phys-
ical acts leading up to the defamatory broadcast. See Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in
Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. PA. L. Rav. 249, 274-76 (1940).
73 See Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 Hanv. L. Rev. 875, 916 (1956).
74 See Note, Radio Defamation-An Unexplored Field of Law, 14 N.Z.L.J. 266 (1938).
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clearly at fault.75 The proposal was undermined, however, in that the
person whose irresponsible speech creates the injury is also quite likely
to be financially irresponsible.76 Then, too, especially in the network
situation, there would often be serious barriers to bringing the speaker
before the courts of the plaintiff's state. Finally, indemnification raised
some of the same policy questions that complicated the insurance issue,
particularly where the broadcaster's liability was held to be absolute.
These subtle questions, however, were seldom considered in the journals
until after they had been several times before the courts.
Perhaps -the most serious oversight had to do with state legislation
immunizing the broadcaster. As the problems of ad lib defamation and
network broadcasting loomed more important, it became increas-
ingly obvious that strict liability was not the answer. Thus, even before
World War II, several states relaxed this standard,7 but it was de-
velopments at the federal level which touched off the major wave of
state lawmaking in this area. In 1948 the FCC held unequivocally that
the broadcaster had no power of censorship over political speeches he
was required to carry by the "equal time" law.7 Although the Commission
also suggested that the federal obligation implied an immunity from state
tort liability, that was a dictum with rather shaky underpinning.7 The
industry understandably did not trust the Commission's blandishments,
and turned to Congress for relief. During the next few years the Congress
failed to act favorably on any of the numerous immunity proposals
brought before it."° The broadcasters now -had a very strong case to take
75 See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 61, at 25; Vold, supra note 56, at 636. The suggestion
concerning indemnification is still important. A major network representative recently re-
ported, for example, that "insofar as alleviating the threat of such litigation is concerned,
CBS does, of course, endeavor to obtain from those supplying program elements to it full
warranties and indemnities for the material so furnished." Letter from Ralph E. Goldberg,
Law Department, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., to the Author, April 12, 1965. How-
ever, the National Association of Broadcasters' standard form contract for political broad-
casts contains no indemnity dause. See NATIONAL Ass'H or BROADCASTERs, PoLrcAL BROAD-
cAsT CATEcHiSm 17 (4th ed., rev. 1964).
76 See Haley, supra note 50, at 196.
77 See Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 HARv. L. Rav.
727, 739-41 (1951).
78Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
79The principal basis for the Commission's assurance on the immunity question was
an earlier court decision that the Communications Act preempted all state tort claims
against telegraph companies, O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir.
1940). The applicability of that case to the broadcaster's problem was doubtful at best.
Thus much uncertainty remained despite the Port Huron decision. See generally De Grazia,
Equal Political Defamation for All: Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, 20
GEo. WAsH. L. Rv. 706 (1952); Comment, The Broadcaster's Liability Under Section 315
of the Communications Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 516 (1952).
80 See, e.g., H.R. 6949, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950); H.R. 5470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
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to the state legislatures, and the response was a rash of new state laws,
some of which went substantially further than necessary to relieve the
broadcasters of the equal-time dilemma.81 Thus by 1960, when the Su-
preme Court decreed such a federal immunity for equal-time broadcasts,
all but a handful of states had anticipated or exceeded the impact of that
holding."2
There is, of course, no way of telling what might have happened in
the states had the broadcasters not had things quite so much their own
way. It seems fair, however, to speculate that had the scholars and crit-
ics not fought so hard and so long for the untenable line of liability
without fault, and turned instead to drafting statutes to accommodate
more realistically the interests of the injured party and the industry, the
(1952); S. 2539, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. 7062, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R.
7756, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
81 State legislatures have dealt with the problem of political broadcasts in several ways.
Variations are found in the scope of the immunity given: (1) In many instances, the broad-
caster is liable under no circumstances for a defamatory utterance over his facilities by a
candidate for public office, e.g., OLA. STAT. Amx. tit. 12, § 1447.2 (1951); N.Y. Crvm
RiGHTS LAW § 75. (2) Some states extend the scope of the immunity to utterances by or
on behalf of a candidate, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. Awm. ch. 507-A:2 (Supp. 1963); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 1059.5(2) (1956). (3) Nebraska goes even further, seeming to extend the immunity
to any defamatory statement against a candidate for public office regardless of whether
made by or on behalf of a candidate, NEB. REv. STAT. § 86-602 (1958).
In many states various limitations are then put upon the immunity: (1) The broad-
caster is liable for a defamation by, on behalf of, or against, as the case may be, a candi-
date if, under federal laws or the regulations of federal agencies, the broadcast could be
censored or controlled, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.052 (1958); PA. STAT. ANx. § 12.1585
(1953); but cf. Wyo. STAT. § 1-873 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-632.1 (1948); e.g., where no
reference is made to censorship or control (i.e., the immunity appears to be unlimited).
(2) An altogether different type of limitation is found in two states where an announcement
must be made either before and after broadcast, or after broadcast: S.C. CODE § 23-7 (1962)
("The broadcast you have just heard was not censored in accord with the immunity from
censorship extended legally qualified political candidates."); N.Y. Civm RiorTs LAW § 75
(must announce that the remarks of the candidate are not to be construed as reflecting the
opinions, beliefs, etc. of the stations, its ownership or management). (3) A third type of
limitation is that the immunity is lost if the defamation is uttered by the owner, licensee,
or employee of the station in the course of his employment: e.g., Miss. Conz AxN.
§ 1059.5(2) (1956). But cf. CONN. Gmx. STAT. ANx. § 52-239 (1958) (owner of station
must have participated wilfully, knowingly and with intent to defame in order to forfeit
the immunity).
In Maryland, the broadcaster is liable only for compensatory damages in any case
where a candidate for public office defames another not a candidate for public office, MD.
CODE ANN. art. 75, § 6(b) (1957).
82 See 44 MAnm. L. Rav. 787, 789 (1960). Only five states (Alabama, Alaska, Delaware,
Rhode Island, and Vermont), the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands have never enacted any legislation affecting the broadcaster's liability. Illinois comes
close to having no specific treatment by putting everything under the penal code. To be
liable for criminal defamation, one must intend to defame. It was obviously the purpose
of the legislature to bring slander by means of radio and television within the statute. Ia.
STAT. ANNt. 38 § 27-1 (1961).
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immunity actually accorded under state law might never have been so
broad."'
The wave of state legislation in the late 1940's was significant in
quite another way. We have already observed how much time and
energy were spent debating libel vs. slander and publisher vs. bookseller,
and some of the consequences of that unfortunate diversion. What makes
the debate the more unfortunate is that while the debaters argued, the
courts and the legislatures were quietly resolving or removing the de-
bated issues. This was done in several ways: The facts of many of the
cases made the libel-slander issue irrelevant.8 4 To the extent that the
facts did not moot the debate about these questions, the statutes helped
to do so. Many legislatures, before they did anything else in this area,
decreed that radio defamation was either libel or slander (usually libel)
or without the label, gave it the unmistakable legal characteristics of one
or the other. Many of the statutes also resolved the standard-of-care ques-
tions. A common provision, for example, gave complete immunity to the
broadcaster who had exercised ordinary care except when his own em-
ployee was at fault.85 Under laws of this sort, it made no difference whether
8 3 The arguments for absolute liability were most forcefully advanced by Prof. Law-
rence Vold. See Vold, Defamation by Radio, 2 J. RADio LAW 673 (1932); Vold, Defamatory
Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 249 (1940).
8 4 In some cases the allegations would have been actionable either as libel or as slander,
for example, because they fell into one of the "per se" categories, e.g., Lynch v. Lyons, 303
Mass. 116, 20 N.E.2d 953 (1939) ; in others the distinction was immaterial because recovery
could not be had under either rubric, e.g., Barry v. Kirkland, 149 Neb. 839, 32 N.W.2d 757
(1948). The standard of care also became superfluous in a number of cases-either because
the broadcaster had shown a lack of ordinary care, e.g., Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188
(8th Cir. 1962); or because the offense was committed by one of the broadcaster's own
employees, for whose torts he was responsible under ordinary agency principles, e.g., Miles
v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
85 Present state legislation on this question reveals many variations when the speaker
is someone other than the broadcaster or a person in his employ. As for burden of proof,
there are four distinct types: (1) The broadcaster is liable where the plaintiff alleges and
proves a failure of the station owner or an employee to exercise due care to prevent the
defamation, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 5482(1) (1961); S.D. CODE § 47.0506 (Supp. 1960). (2)
The exercise of due care is presumed, in some manner, from a bona fide compliance with
federal regulations and laws, e.g., AmIz. REv. STAT. § 12-652 A Supp. 1953; Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 411.062 (1956). (3) The broadcaster is liable unless he alleges and proves the exercise of due
care with respect to the defamatory broadcast, e.g., Ono CODE ANN. § 2739.03(B) (1953) ;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 41340 (1961). (4) The broadcaster in one state is liable where the plain-
tiff alleges lack of due care unless the broadcaster proves the exercise of due care, TENNr.
CODE Am. § 23-2606 (Supp. 1964).
The degree of culpability necessary for liability also differs: (1) In two states there
is no mention that the immunity is conditioned upon a degree of culpability, Miss. CODE
ANN. § 1059.5 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-09 (1959). (2) See statutes cited supra
note 85, where broadcaster must exercise due care in order to come within the immunity.
(3) Some states hold the broadcaster liable only upon proof of actual malice relating to
the defamation, e.g., IDAUO CODE §§ 6-706, 6-708 (1947).
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one called the broadcaster a "publisher" or a "disseminator," for the only
legal consequence to which that classification was pertinent had by legis-
lation been removed from the realm of dispute. It would be unfair to sug-
gest, of course, that these issues were easy simply because the legislatures
could settle them so readily. It is enough to point out that it became ever
more pointless to debate the old issues as though the common law was
the only guide to decision. It was the increasing futility of these con-
troversies that made them particularly unfortunate.
Finally, the preoccupation with nearly dead issues overshadowed two
further matters that should have received prominent attention. First was
the nature and unique impact of radio, and later of television, as com-
munication media. The inapplicability of the old libel-slander criteria
should have made it obvious that radio was different in many ways rele-
vant to tort liability. Those differences were soon to intrigue social psychol-
ogists and others in the behavioral studies.8" In terms of the number of
hours each day the set played in the average home, the irrational devo-
tion of fans to their favorite programs, and the quite rational dependence
upon the radio for news and information and contact with vital public
events-in terms of all these, radio as a medium presented entirely new
and different considerations as the backdrop to tort liability. And what-
ever could be said of radio, it was even more true of television, for studies
have shown how much greater is the impact of a particular communica-
tion when received through the senses of sight and sound simultaneously
Another test of liability is used in a few states. The broadcaster may require advance
copy of the proposed script. If he does so, he is immune from liability for any defamatory
matter actually broadcast which is not contained in the script, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 770.03
(1959); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.64.010 (1961).
Furthermore, the extent of damages recoverable in any suit against the owner, operator,
licensee or employee is defined by some statutes. The plaintiff is sometimes limited only to
actual damages, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN., REV. STAT. tit. 45, § 1353 (1950); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 86-603 (1958); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-652 (C) Supp. 1953. Other states specifically pre-
scribe the recovery of punitive damages, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1447.3 (1951).
Broadcasters are given an opportunity to retract in some jurisdictions. Statutes usually set
forth standards which the retraction must meet. If a retraction conforms to the standards, and
if the defamation was made without an intent to defame and in good faith, retraction
will limit the plaintiff's recovery to special damages, in some jurisdictions, and merely go
to mitigation damages in others, e.g., CAL. Cxv. CODE § 48a; N.C. GENt. STAT. §§ 99-1(b),
99-2(b) 1943; ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.160 (1961).
86 For a fascinating detailed case study of the radio broadcast of Orson Welles' "In-
vasion from Mars," which dearly illustrated how powerful was the grip of radio upon its
audience, see CANT, GAuDET & HERzoO, INVAsION Pom MARs (1940). A later case study
reinforced and underscored the persuasive power of radio as a communication medium,
MERTON, F-sxE & Curns, MAss PERsusiox: Tim SociAL PsYcHoLoGY oF A WAR BOND
DavE (1946). Other materials may be found in HOVLAND, LurmSDAINW & SHEFF ELD, EXPER-
nhTENTs oN MAss ComirmcAnoNs (1949); HoVLM, JANIS & KE=Y, COmM.uJNCATiON
AND PERsUASION (1953); LAzARsPELD & STANTON, ComUNICATIoNs RESEARCH 1948-49
(1949); LAZA sPELD & KENDALL, RADIo LISTENING nT Am.EICA (1948).
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than through either alone.17 But the law of defamation was shockingly
ill-equipped to cope with the tortious potential of television. For years
courts and commentators found little to differentiate the new broadcast
medium from the old.
The second oversight is perhaps less distressing than the first. Dur-
ing the years of radio, defamation was the principal ground of litigation,
although there were a few cases involving various forms of unfair competi-
tion and copyright infringement. Since the age of television, however, in-
vasion of privacy has become at least as important a source of tort liability
for broadcasters as defamation.' And the questions raised by the privacy
suits may be even more difficult to analyze, and more troublesome in
terms of public policy. The burgeoning of television privacy litigation is
important here for two reasons: First, looking to the past, the difficulty the
courts have had in coping with these new cases seems in part a consequence
of the same preoccupation that immobilized the law of broadcasting
liability in the defamation area; and second, with an eye to the future, any
discussion of proper standards of liability can no longer overlook the im-
pact of this newer branch of tort law upon broadcasting.
B. Tke Searck for Workable Standards
Enough has been said -to show the need to fashion or clarify compre-
hensive principles of liability. Many problems still demand analytical
solution. If, therefore, we repudiate the libel-slander distinctions, and
the pointless quest for analogies, there is a need to recast the analysis in
more modern, more workable terms. These new terms should combine
two characteristics which may at first seem incompatible: On the one
hand, they must be general enough to deal with privacy claims as well as
defamation suits, and possibly other related torts that involve reputation,
character, or feelings. On the other hand, new criteria must be capable
of particular application to cases the facts of which vary greatly; that
is, they must avoid the rigidity of analysis that led in the 1930's to the
generalization of broad principles from a few early cases that soon
proved to be unrepresentative. With these general considerations in
87 See, e.g., STEsnR, THE PEOPLE LooK AT TELEVISION: A STUD7 or AuDI-cxE AT=-
TUDES (1963); Rose, Attitude As A Function of Discrepancy Resolution in Multiple Channel
Communication (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1964), pp. 22, 26;
Elliott, Memory for Visual, Auditory and Visual-Auditory Material, 29 ARcHavEs OF Psy-
CHoL~oGY 199 (1936); Hartman, Single and Multiple Channel Communication: A Review of
Research and A Proposed Model, 9 AuDIo-VIsuAL COm-mJHicATioNs REV. 235 (1961); Koch,
Some Factors Affecting the Relative Efficiency of Certain Modes of Presenting Material for
Memorizing, 43 Am. J. PsYCHOLOGY 370 (1930).
88 See cases cited notes 8-11 supra.
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mind, it is now time to consider some general principles of broadcaster's
liability.
1. Source of the Offending Material
A broadcaster may incur tort liability from material that is either
contained in a prepared script or unexpectedly interjected during a broad-
cast. The latter category includes that which is ad libbed during a broad-
cast based upon a wiitten script, and that which occurs during a program
for which no script could have been prepared (interviews on the street,
sporting events, spot news coverage, and the like). The presence of of-
fending material in the script would appear relevant not so much to the
old question whether defamation is to be treated as libel or slander, but
rather to the more meaningful question of which parties are to be held
liable and to what degree.
For example, the broadcaster's liability should be beyond doubt where
a script has been submitted and reviewed in advance. The other partici-
pants in the preparation of the program are also presumably liable, at least
in the absence of some good excuse-the sponsor, the producer, the adver-
tising agency, the station representative and perhaps others. For these
parties, it should make little difference whether the standard be one of
strict liability or of negligence, for a lack of due care could presumably
be shown.
In its very nature it might appear that an invasion of privacy could
arise only from a script. To date most of the cases have been of this
sort. But privacy claims could arise from coverage of spot news events,
or sporting events, or of various forms of entertainment (such as the film-
ing of a nightclub audience)." A recent Florida case presented just this
89 See FFEzom Or INJoRATION CENE, TURBULENCE n THE PRIVAcY FIELD 3-4 (Pub.
No. 133, 1964); Yoder, "Be Good! Television's Watching," Sat. Evening Post, May 14, 1949,
p. 24; Note, The Right of Privacy and Television, 28 NoTaE DAME LAW. 389, 397 (1953);
cf. Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Report-
ing of Fact, 16 STA.. L. REv. 107, 117-21 (1963). Several courts have refused to find ac-
tionable invasions of privacy in telecasts of public or semi-public events in which the plain-
tiff was "a willing and knowing participant, even though he may have been unaware of the
presence of the TV camera, Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485
(1952); Chavez v. Hollywood Post No. 43, American Legion, 16 U.S.L. WEEK 2362 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1948); Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2044 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 26, 1949). Recently one television station, apparently concerned about pos-
sible liability under such circumstances, refused to broadcast the names, pictures, voices, and
statements of various public figures (President Truman, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson,
Eleanor Roosevelt and others) during a controversial state campaign over a right-to-work
law proposal. The General Counsel of the FCC prepared a legal memorandum concerning
the applicable state law and its effect upon the broadcaster's possible liabilities. See Geller,
A Legal Memorandum: "Right to Privacy" Statutes and Case Law, 12 FED. B. NEWS 6
(1965). The memorandum concludes that a broadcaster could not incur liability under the
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situation.9" The plaintiff was an innocent bystander during a gambling raid
on a cigar store. The event was filmed by a local television station and
portions of the films were broadcast during an evening news program.
The plaintiff's proximity to the raid insinuated, he claimed, some associa-
tion with the illicit activities. But the court rejected the claim, influenced
partly by the strong public interest in the prompt and unfettered dissem-
ination of news material.91 Nevertheless there is the distinct possibility
that a suit of this sort will eventually succeed on privacy grounds.
When the offending material is contained in a script, there are two
further questions. It may be that the station failed for some reason to re-
view the script before the broadcast. If so, it should be determined why
no better precautions were taken. And if no explanation comes forth, it
might be reasonable to presume that since an opportunity for review
existed the unexplained failure to delete the offending content would fur-
nish the basis of liability. 2 The other situation is a bit harder, though.
Where the injury could not have been anticipated, even by a prudent
broadcaster, from the text of the script, it will be necessary to determine
whether the broadcaster, like the publisher, is nevertheless strictly liable
regardless of his innocence. The answer to this question should depend not
on any factual analogy between broadcasting and publishing, but rather
on the special policies that are relevant to the balancing of particular in-
terests among the various parties. That question invites a closer examina-
tion of other factors.
2. Relationship Between the Speaker and the Broadcaster
More troublesome than the offending script is the case of the defama-
tory ad lib of which the script (if there is is one) affords no warning. In
this case the relationship between the broadcaster and the speaker be-
comes important. We assume that the speaker, at least, is always liable.
applicable state law for the use of statements by and news clips about such public figures
as those involved in the right-to-work law case.
0ojacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
91 Id. at 40. For expressions of similar cautions by other courts, see Charles Parker
Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 616-17, 116 A.2d 440, 445 (1955); Dale Sys.
v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745, 751-52 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Gearhart v. WSAZ,
Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98, 107 (ELD. Ky. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958); Summit
Hotel Co. v. NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 202-03, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
92 These were essentially the facts in Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82
(1932), although the court's acceptance of the principle of absolute liability made it un-
necessary to consider the possible effect of the unexplained failure to review the script which
was available prior to the broadcast. It is noteworthy that the statutes of several states
provide that the broadcaster may demand a script in advance of the scheduled broadcast
and, having reviewed the script, will not be liable for any defamatory utterances that go
over the air which did not appear in the script. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 770.03 (1961);
WASH. RnV. CoDE AzN. § 19.64.010 (1961).
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If he is an employee of the station, then the broadcaster's liability fol-
lows from general principles of agency law. More common is the case in
which the speaker, although invited and scheduled to use the facilities,
is not an employee of the station, nor otherwise formally associated with
the broadcaster. In this situation, unless the broadcaster's liability is ab-
solute, a court might consider whether reasonable care was exercised in
selecting or scheduling the speaker. Where such care has been exercised,
it may be unduly 'harsh to hold the broadcaster liable. 3
Another "ad lib" case involves a speaker who is neither an employee
nor a scheduled user of the station. In this category are the impromptu
interview with the man on the street, or the remark shouted in the
sports arena or overheard during coverage of a Presidential inauguration.
Here it may be possible to show some lack of care by the broadcaster or
his staff-for example, in having left open a microphone in the crowd that
should have been turned off, or in inviting too many unknown and untested
persons to participate in street-corner symposia. But where no such lack
of precautions can be shown, there seems an insufficient basis for the
broadcaster's liability.
3. Timing of the Broadcast
Surely it should make a difference whether the offending program is
being broadcast "live" or by delayed transmission. The live broadcast
gives the station little or no chance to protect itself against possible li-
ability, and there are many instances in which live or simultaneous broad-
casting is desirable if not essential, particularly in the sustained coverage
9 3 See statutes cited note 85 supra, for a survey of the various ways in which this
situation has been handled by the state legislatures. Any criterion of this sort raises, of
course, difficult issues as to what constitutes "reasonable precautions" or "due care" on the
part of a broadcaster. Undoubtedly the question would be referable in large part to pre-
vailing industry practices, although the industry should not be able simply by custom to
lower the requisite standard of care unduly. Cf. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1932), cert. denied sub norn. Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern Bargs Co., 287 U.S. 662
(1933). For some of the pertinent precautions that might be expected, see Reummers, supra
note 77, at 742-44.
An executive of one of the major issuers of broadcast defamation insurance reports:
"We have always urged the particular use of care by broadcasters and the use of such
devices as recording apparatus and the requirement of advance copies of speeches for
whatever value they may be in minimizing libel losses and claims. This, of course, is a
continuing effort." Letter from Reginald Geiser, Assistant Vice President, Employers Re-
insurance Corp. to the Author, March 4, 1965.
A major network executive responds that "most of the larger broadcasters, particularly
the networks, do have their own legal departments, whose function it is to review material
for broadcast in an effort to prevent the broadcast of any defamatory material or any
material invading rights of privacy." Letter from Mortimer Weinbach, Vice President,
American Broadcasting Co. to the Author, March 26, 1965.
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of important news eventsY4 Here it would seem severe to penalize the
broadcaster for trying to bring news and special events to the audience as
fast as possible.
The suggestion has been made that the broadcaster may guard him-
self, even during the live broadcast, by alerting his engineers to cut off
immediately any program in which defamatory material is detected. 5
One system used, especially in the ad libbed interviewing situation, em-
ploys a tape delay mechanism which allows a delay of several seconds
between the time the words are uttered and the time they are broadcast.
This affords only partial protection, however, for there are several miti-
gating factors: First, and perhaps most obvious, is the difficulty in identi-
fying actionable defamation,e second, the ad libbed defamation typically
involves only a few seconds of air time; 97 and third, excessive zeal in moni-
toring of this sort would quite likely produce an undesirable degree of self-
censorship contrary to the public interest.9 Thus the broadcaster's only
effective precaution would seem to be to record all programs for delayed
broadcast. That alternative may not only increase cost significantly, but
may also forfeit the advantages of rapid live transmission of current
events.
4. Source of the Broadcast: Network or Local
Offhand it might appear that the broadcaster has much greater con-
trol over programs originating in his own studios than over those re-
ceived from the network wires or cables.99 But this is true only where
9 4 A major network president has recently commented upon the difficulty of pains-
taking precautions in the handling of spot news and feature material: "Because you have
to maintain speed, you particularly need responsible people on -television. . . . There is
little or no time to edit a fast-breaking story. You rely on the ability and judgment of
the man on the scene whose 'copy' goes direct to the viewers at home." Kintner, "Broad-
casting and the News," Harper's, April 1965, p. 49, at 52.
Or Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 353, 243 N.W. 82, 85 (1932); McDonald &
Grimshaw, Radio Defamation, 9 Am L. Rav. 328, 332 (1938).
96 See Graham, Defamation and Radio, 12 WASH. L. REv. 282, 289 (1937).
97 See Davis, Libel and Slander by Radio, 34 CASE & Coma:5ENT 67, 70 (1928).
98 See Guider, Liability for Defamation in Political Broadcasts, 2 J. RADro LAw 708,
712 (1932).
9 9 Some states provide by statute that where a defamation is broadcast over two
or more radio or television stations in a network, liability is restricted to the originating
station, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-709 (Supp. 1963); MONT. Rxv. CODE § 64-207 (1953). See also
statutes cited supra note 88, where the broadcaster is liable if he fails to exercise due care.
Where a network program is broadcast live, it would be difficult to say that the broad-
caster was negligent in allowing the broadcast of a defamation. Another circumstance is
where the network program is taped and broadcast is delayed for a time. It is theoretically
possible to place on the broadcaster the burden of viewing each such taped program in
order to edit any defamatory matter. Considering the bulk of network material, however,
broadcasters could well be heard to argue that such a burden would weigh too heavily
on them. See Broadcasting, March 22, 1965, p. 48, for the current controversy over a
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the network material is transmitted simultaneously; if it is taped upon
receipt and delayed, then obviously it is subject to the same scrutiny
as pre-recorded local material. The network affiliation contract typically
requires the local affiliated station to carry a certain amount of network
material. 1°0 Thus there is some question about the flexibility of the
local stations in rejecting or selecting among network material, and it
would not, of course, be easy to find a last-minute local substitute for a
network program that presents possible tort liability. Because of these and
other problems presented by network broadcasts, the courts might in the
future examine more closely the particular legal relationship between
network and affiliate. Such examination has been undertaken in other
contexts,"' but has seldom been applied to the tort field.
5. Sponsorship of the Broadcast
The offending program may have been commercially sponsored or
it may have been carried by the station or network as "sustaining" ma-
terial to which a certain amount of time must be devoted."0 2 This distinc-
tion should probably have no effect upon the broadcaster's own liability.
But where the program is sponsored, there are obviously more difficult
questions regarding the liability of persons other than the broadcaster.
The fact of commercial sponsorship is not necessarily relevant to
the sponsor's actual participation in the preparation of the program. Some
programs are prepared largely under the sponsor's own supervision.
Others are left almost entirely to the advertising agency, with only oc-
casional consultation of the sponsor for high-level decisions. 103 In recent
years there has been an increasing tendency to assign the preparation
proposed FCC ruling to restrict network control of programming. Cf. Kintner, "Broad-
casting and the News," Harper's, April 1965, p. 49 at 52-53 for a discussion of the problems
of on the spot broadcasting of news and feature material which may also be too difficult
to screen. Thus the better solution with respect to network matter would be to follow
the example of Idaho and Montana.
10OThis statement is, of course, an oversimplification of the relationship between
network and affiliated station. It must be qualified in terms both of the economic aspects
of network broadcasting, and of the rather tight FCC regulation of the broadcast
licensee's relationship with the network. See HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AaMERICA 229-32 (1956);
LAwTox, THE MODERN BROADCASTER 109-10 (1961); and for an exhaustive study, see
Columbia Broadcasting System, Network Practices (Memorandum Supplementing State-
ment of Frank Stanton, President; Prepared for the Senate Committee on Interstate &
Foreign Commerce) (1956).
101 See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); CBS v. United States, 316
U.S. 407 (1942).102 For a thorough discussion of the FCC's requirement that a certain portion of
every broadcaster's time be allotted to sustaining material, see SmEAD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH
BY RADIO An TELEvISION 63-73 (1959).
1oaFor a description of the role of the advertising agency in television program
production, see BARNouw, THE TELEViSION WmaR 26-27 (1962).
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of "packaged" programs to outside producers, with neither the sponsor
nor the agency supervising the details. 04 Even under this arrangement,
however, a program is unlikely to go on the air without review by either
the advertiser or the agency1
0 5
Another phenomenon of recent years is that of multiple sponsorship.
In the heyday of radio and during the early years of TV, the pattern
was primarily one of single-sponsor assignment of particular time slots,
often actually bearing the sponsor's name. Today the general practice
is to share the sponsorship,'01 with the late evening variety programs,
particularly, presenting a seemingly endless series of unrelated com-
mercial messages. Whatever the reason for its widespread adoption,
multiple sponsorship clearly poses new and difficult problems in appor-
tioning liability among a number of possible defendants.
One solution, which has the virtue of simplicity if no other, would be
to hold all the sponsors equally liable for any tortious material during
the entire program. A second would be to apportion liability according
to the proportion of total commercial time devoted to each sponsor's
wares, on the theory that the benefit derived from the broadcast is
roughly reflected in this factor. A third approach might be to confine
liability to those advertisers directly responsible for -the particular seg-
ment of the program during which the injury occurs. But if it is a matter
of chance just when the offending material is broadcast, it seems inequit-
able to impose liability by so fortuitous a test. Thus the second test would
seem the most reasonable-unless, of course, one or more of the sponsors,
or his representative, actually participated in or condoned the prepara-
tion of the offensive material.
104 See 'Production of TV Shows Shifts More and More to Hollywood," N.Y. Times,
March 30, 1965, p. 95, cols. 3-4. For a vivid and colorful description of the increasingly im-
portant activities of the outside program "packager," see Oro~owsxy, TV: THE BiG
Picruax 128-36 (1961).
'05The leading television columnist of the New York Times has observed, "Actually
a television show does not reach the air without the constant involvement of representa-
tives of networks, advertising agencies and sponsors; their relationship with the package
producer is sustained and extremely intimate. They are also present at all shows." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1959, p. 39, col. 4. It is a persistent complaint about American television,
in fact, that sponsors exercise too much control over program content, to the detriment
of quality and cultural level. See, e.g., Siepmann, "What Is Wrong With TV-and With Us?,"
N.Y. Times, April 19, 1964, VI, p. 13. Compare the British experience, under which the
Independent Television Authority (the commercial network) exercises extensive control
over programs while the sponsors are theoretically denied any power to supervise pro-
gram content. See STREET, FREDo-, THE INDivmuAL AND THE LAW 79-81 (1963).
106 See, e.g., the patterns of joint sponsorship reflected in preliminary sales of prime
evening broadcast time by the three major networks for the 1965-66 season, in "Detailed
Wrapup of Fall TV Schedules," Broadcasting, March 1, 1969, pp. 30-32.
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6. The Medium: Radio or Television
Whether the tort be defamation or invasion of privacy, it is likely
to have far greater impact on television than on radio. In part this is
because of the much larger audiences that view almost any TV program.0 7
The greater impact of television results also because the radio audience
consists increasingly of casual listeners-automobile drivers, for example,
or sunbathers at the beach-who lack the intensity or the preoccupation
of the video viewer.108 To some extent the greater impact of television can
be taken for granted; but it might be appropriate in assessing damages
for injury to privacy or reputation to gather relevant behavioral studies
measuring the psychological import of this factor." 9
7. Retraction
In many states, special statutes provide for reduction of damages or
even a complete defense if the defendant issues a retraction at the plaintiff's
request." 0 Usually the demand must be made within a certain time after
the alleged defamation. In some states, indeed, the making of such a
demand, and the defendant's failure to accede to it, are prerequisites to
the plaintiff's suit.
Retraction statutes have encountered various obstacles. Some state
courts, in fact, have held these statutes unconstitutional on various
grounds."' Apart from these questions, there is some doubt whether the
concept of retraction is even appropriate to broadcasting. The whole
theory of a retraction is that it will correct in the minds of the audience
the false impression created. The assumption may be sound in the case
of a newspaper or magazine, where the readership is fairly stable and
107 In 1963, for example, during the prime evening hour of 9-10:00 p.m., there were
an average of 33.9 million homes viewing television, while only 5.5 million homes listened
to the radio during that same hour. Only in the very early morning hours does radio
any longer effectively compete with television in audience size. Compare MEDIA RESSEaRc
Div., A. C. NIE.sF'i Co., RADIo '63 10 (1963), with MEDIA RESEARCu Div., A. C.
NIELSEN Co., TELavisiox '63 8 (1963).
108 In summer, more than half the average weekly hours of radio listening involve
battery portables and automobile radios; for the winter months, the average figure is
only slightly less than half. See MEaIA RESFARCH Div., A. C. NiE-SEN Co., RADIo '63 9
(1963)..
109 See materials cited note 86 supra.
110 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a. The general formula of such statutes is to permit
recovery of general damages only if a retraction is demanded within a certain time after
the offending broadcast, and if the retraction is not issued thereafter. Some also provide that
general damages may be recovered despite the issuance of a retraction if a specific intent
to defame can be established by the plaintiff, e.g., ORE. RXv. STAT. § 30.160 (1961).
llE.g., Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888). For a
thorough discussion, pro and con, of the constitutionality of retraction statutes as applied
to broadcasting, see Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co., 228 Ore. 405, 365 P.2d 845 (1961)
(4-3 decision).
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constant, but is questionable in the broadcasting field where most
audiences tend to be somewhat more fickle-except perhaps in the case
of certain commentators or stars with a fairly constant following." 2 The
problem of issuing an effective retraction is particularly acute in the very
kinds of broadcasting where defamation is most likely to occur-special
events, news programs, political addresses, panel discussions and the
like which are "one shot" broadcasts without a recurrent audience. 31
Even if a correction is broadcast the next day over the same station at
the same time as the original falsehood, the probability of its reaching
any substantial portion of the original audience is quite conjectural.""
The application of retraction, particularly to television, raises
several other questions. Where the plaintiff is injured by a dramatic char-
acterization, or by the display of his photograph, can any mere statement
ever effectively correct the misimpression?".5 On the other hand, is there
any other form in which the notice of retraction is meaningful? None
has been suggested. Perhaps the answer is that even a corrective state-
ment is better than nothing, though obviously inadequate to undo the
damage wrought by a defamatory characterization woven into the fabric
of a 90-minute drama. There is also a question about the application of
the retraction mechanism to privacy suits. Although there would logically
appear to be nothing to "retract," one court has suggested that a demand
1 2 See, e.g., Wanamaker v. Lewis, 173 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1959), involving a state-
ment of apology by Fulton Lewis, Jr., the radio news commentator, and an admission that
he had made a "horrifying mistake" with respect to the plaintiff. The statement was
broadcast on Lewis' Monday program following the Friday newscast on which the
offending statement appeared, at the very same hour and over the same stations.
113 See Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 697, 61 A.2d 143, 146 (Ct. Err. & App.
1948). Because of uncertainties about the appropriateness of retraction to broadcasting, it
is not surprising that broadcasters occasionally refuse to comply with a plaintiff's request
for a retraction. See, e.g., Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605,
116 A.2d 440 (1955); Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co., 256 N.C. 382, 124 S.E.2d 98
(1962).
114 A possible alternative to retraction which might merit discussion in the broadcasting
context is the "right of reply" conferred upon the injured party by the law of many
European nations. See Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for
Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game
and Fair Comment I, 42 CoLJm. L. REV. 1085, 1109-15 (1942).
The "right of reply" is essentially the formula employed by the FCC in attempting
to redress personal attacks made by a broadcaster upon a public official or political candidate.
The Commission's "fairness doctrine" has frequently been held to require the affording
of an opportunity for the injured party to respond. See FCC, Applicability of the Fairness
Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 FED. RaG. 10415,
10420-21 (1964).
115 Analogous questions have arisen in the publishing field in determining the
sufficiency, for example, of a "retraction" designed to mitigate the effect of a defamatory
photograph. See, e.g., Southeastern Newspapers, Inc. v. Walker, 76 Ga. App. 57, 44 S.E.2d
697 (1947).
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for retraction would nevertheless be appropriate, at least where a claim
for defamation might also have been made.""
8. Retention of a Record of the Broadcast
Originally the libel-slander test sometimes turned on the extraneous
factor of whether the station had recorded the broadcast." 7 While this
was an attempt to ascertain the "permanence" of form of the defamation,
the fact of recording would be of little significance unless the program
was rebroadcast from the tape. In that case, a subsequent publication of
the offending material, particularly after the plaintiff protested, should
certainly affect the measure of damages." 8 Otherwise, it should make no
difference whether the broadcaster retained some permanent record of
the program. Indeed, the prudent broadcaster may be well advised to
keep such recordings to establish in the event of litigation precisely what
was said and shown over the air.
9. Balancing of Public Interests
The juxtaposition of all these factors does not, of course, produce
a neat or simple test of liability. The great merit of the libel-slander
dichotomy, the publisher-distributor analogies, and the like, was that
they did produce such a test, even if it was not logical or particularly
appropriate to the new media. What is suggested here is that the char-
acteristics of these media are so complex and the range of broadcasting
situations so broad that courts ought to reject simple tests and consider
all the relevant factors. Some of these have already been outlined. A few
more remain to be considered.
One element that courts do occasionally, and properly, consider is the
strength of the public interest in the defendant's conduct. There is ob-
viously a far greater value in the broadcasting of spot coverage of racial
demonstrations, or the aftermath of a presidential assassination, than in
a commercial or a quiz show. Quite apart from the much greater control
the broadcaster can exercise over the content of the programs of the latter
116 See, e.g., Werner v. Times-Mirror Corp., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208
(1961). For a suggestion that the suit for invasion of privacy may have been used, or
abused, by plaintiffs' attorneys in an effort to circumvent the inhibiting effect of retraction
upon defamation suits, see Powsner, Libel in Limbo: Another Conquest for the Right of
Privacy?, 30 Los AGELES B. BuLL. 365 (1955).
"17 See Note, Damages for Defamation by Radio, 25 Cm.-KENT L. Rsv. 142, 147 (1947).
118 The originator of the defamatory broadcast would presumably be liable even for
a republication by someone else, perhaps even by a listener or viewer who bad recorded
the program for his own use. On the original publisher's liability for republication, see
generally PRossER, ToRTs 787 (3d ed. 1964).
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type, the strength of the public interest ought to restrict the broadcaster's
liability in those areas affected with the greatest public interest."9
On the other hand, the apparent purpose or motive of the particular
defendant may be highly relevant. Consider, for example, a recent Penn-
sylvania case which makes this point. 20 The plaintiff, operator of a garage
and towing service, had been charged with various offenses in connection
with a "car-towing racket," and criminal charges were then pending. ie
had protested his innocence, and eventually -his conviction was reversed
on appeal. Before the appeal was argued, however, the defendant radio
station scheduled a broadcast, a "news documentary," designed to ex-
pose the "racket," which prominently portrayed plaintiff's part in these
activities. On the morning of the day of the broadcast, the plaintiff's
wife happened to see an announcement of it in the newspaper. She tele-
phoned the station several times to urge that the program be withheld,
because she believed her husband innocent. Representatives of the station
refused, and the program went on the air as scheduled. The court, in sus-
taining the plaintiff's judgment, was understandably influenced by the
broadcaster's callous indifference -to the possibly crippling injury it was
about to inflict. Thus, whatever privilege the public interest in com-
ment on current news and special events may have conferred upon the
broadcaster it was clearly overcome by the defendant's almost malicious
conduct.'' This sort of balancing of interests and equities seems alto-
gether proper.
II
FEDERALISM AND THE BROADCASTER'S TORT LIABILITY
Two general observations seem appropriate at the outset. First, the
field of tort liability for defamation, invasion of privacy, and other similar
claims is only one of several contexts in which the broadcaster may be
caught between federal and state law. There has recently been much
controversy and some litigation involving two other very important
and difficult contexts-community antenna television.22 and pay tele-
119 See 38 Mcn. L. REV. 415, 417 (1940).
12 0 Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167, 191 A.2d 662 (1963).
121 It was on this basis that the Pennsylvania court not only rejected all the broad-
caster's claims of privilege or immunity, but actually upheld the granting of punitive
damages. Here the inference of malice was dear, and the defendant's conduct considerably
more odious than that of the broadcaster or publisher who simply refused to issue
a retraction upon demand, since here "the request not to defame was made before the
publication of the libel." Id. at 185-86, 191 A.2d at 671-72.
122 The leading case concerning community anteina television is Cable Vision, Inc.
v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964). Community antennas have gone generally
unregulated by the FCC. See Note, Community Antenna Television: Survey of a Regulatory
Problem, 52 GEo. L.J. 136 (1963). It now seems quite likely, however, that the FCC will
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vision. 23 In the next decades these areas may well present more problems
and cases than those we have been considering here. But for the moment
the material in the tort field is far richer. It seems appropriate to attempt
to fashion here some principles of federalism that may later be carried
over to aid in the solution of the difficult problems that are almost certain
to arise elsewhere.
Federal law impinges in several ways upon the broadcaster's activities.
Most obvious is the impact of federal regulation under the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934.124 Less obvious is the relevance of the first
amendment, quite apart from the very controversial "censorship" issues
under the Communications Act. Still less apparent is the impact upon the
broadcaster of the federal law of copyright and unfair competition-
which under recent Supreme Court decisions may partially displace state
law covering the same fields. 125 It would be impossible, or at least ill-ad-
vised, to judge the broadcaster's potential tort liability under state law
without taking careful account of each of these important branches of
federal law. We begin with a consideration of the first amendment.
A. The Broadcaster and the First Amendment
Almost since the beginning of federal regulation of radio, the broad-
caster has sought refuge in the first amendment. The principal conten-
tion has been over regulation of program content-whether taking past
program performance into account in license renewal proceedings in-
fringes either upon the first amendment's guarantees of free expression
or on the Communications Act's own non-censorship section. The
courts -have consistently rejected the broadcaster's claims in this area,
although seldom facing the constitutional issue squarely. These questions
are surely worth a full article by themselves, and they have received ex-
tensive treatment elsewhere. 2 6 Our concern is with a totally different
interaction between broadcasting and the first amendment.
The immediate question of how far the first amendment protects
soon assert general regulatory authority over CATV systems. See Broadcasting, March 29,
1965, p. 5.
123 See FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER, THE Toils or PAY TELEVISION, (Pub. No. 136,
1965).
12448 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
125 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
126 See generally S.EAD, op. cit. supra note 102, ch. 2. For an extensive memorandum
on the authority of the FCC to take account of program content in exercising its licensing
function, see Rosenblum, Authority of the Federal Communications Commission, in COONS,
FREEDom & RESPONSIBIITY IN BROADCASTING 96 (1961). For a recent discussion of the
problem and a collection of pertinent materials, see Note, Regulation of Program Content
by the FCC, 77 HAxv. L. REv. 701 (1964).
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the broadcaster against state tort liability begins with the Supreme Court's
1964 decision in the New York Times libel case.127 The Court there held
that a newspaper could not be liable, under the first and fourteenth
amendments, for the publication of defamatory statements about a public
official unless they had been made with actual malice or with a reckless
disregard for the truth. An independent examination of the material in
question (an editorial advertisement criticizing -the police response to
civil rights demonstrations in Montgomery, Alabama) assured the Court
that neither malice nor recklessness could be proved. This was the view
of six members of the Court. Three Justices' would have gone further
and would have immunized under the first amendment all suits by public
officials against critics of their official conduct, regardless of proof of
malice. 29
There can be no question that the Times decision is relevant for the
broadcaster. 30 Whatever distinction may persist between libel and
slander surely cannot have constitutional significance; the immunity
must apply as much to the spoken as to the written word. The case is
therefore quite significant because a high percentage of the radio-TV
defamation cases have been suits by public officials against critics who
have taken to the air. Thus, the inevitable conclusion that the Times
doctrine applies as much to broadcasting as to publishing at once removes
a substantial segment of the broadcaster's potential tort liability.
It should be noted, however, that -the limitations of the Times decision
are as important as its protections: The case concerns only charges
against public officials, thus probably excluding private citizens who are
merely candidates for public office, and even at that exempts only com-
ment upon their public acts.:31 Thus a false account of the mayor's nightly
trysts would enjoy no constitutional immunity. Nor is there, under the
majority view, any immunity for statements made with actual malice or
in reckless disregard of the truth. There is, of course, a question whether
127 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
128 Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg.
129 justice Goldberg, with whom justice Douglas joined, concluded his concurring
opinion with an expression of his conviction "that the Constitution accords citizens and
press an unconditional freedom to criticize official conduct." 376 U.S. at 305.
130 See Kennedy v. Mid-Continent Telecasting Co., 193 Kan. 544, 394 P.2d 400 (1964),
in which the court found sufficient allegations of actual malice to overcome the New York
Times privilege. For a suggestion that the Times decision may even be of considerable
aid to broadcasters in their "censorship" battle with the FCC, see Editorial, Broadcasting,
March 16, 1964, p. 110.
131 Throughout the majority opinion in the New York Times case, the Court stressed
the phrase "official conduct" in defining the bounds of the privilege. See 376 U.S. at 272,
273, 279, 283. See also Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CoaN=LL L.Q. 581, 593-94 (1964).
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even in a case in which malice could be shown on the part of the speaker,
the broadcaster might nevertheless invoke the constitutional immunity.
No cases have yet considered the question, but it would seem that the
constitutional defense ought to be separately available to each defendant,
so that a lack of individual malice or recklessness would afford any other
defendant a privilege even though it would not, of course, immunize the
speaker. Thus, whatever may be the standards of care under state law,
the broadcaster should enjoy federal immunity from liability for any
defamation of a public official over his facilities which has occurred
despite due care in the selection of speakers and preparation of the pro-
gram, even though the speaker himself may have been reckless or
malicious.
The field of invasion of privacy suggests a further application of the
first amendment to the broadcaster. Although no constitutional defense
has yet been recognized as a bar to privacy suits, one court has found
at least some limitation in the first amendment.3 2 Such caution seems
particularly appropriate where the alleged invasion involves no commer-
cial exploitation or appropriation of the plaintiffs' interest, but only his
portrayal, for example, as a figure in a drama, or the presentation of his
picture during an on-the-spot news report. There are two reasons why
privacy suits may be more vulnerable under the first amendment than
suits for defamation. First is the relative recency of the privacy action,
having been developed by the courts about a century after the adoption
of the first amendment, in contrast to the law of libel, which long ante-
dated the Bill of Rights. The other consideration is the unavailability of
truth as a defense to privacy claims. The relevance of this difference
has recently been stressed by one commentator: "The interest in com-
pensating plaintiffs who suffer as the result of false statements can be no
weaker, and is probably stronger, than the interest in compensating a
plaintiff who suffers as the result of a true statement."M8
A particularly forceful constitutional objection can be made to the
injunctive and criminal remedies that occasionally accompany legislative
recognition of the right of privacy. It is a crime in some states, for ex-
ample, to disclose the name of the victim of a sexual assault, and such
a statute has been applied to at least one broadcaster. 34 The New York
132 Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 40 (Fla. 1955). See
generally Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions
on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAw. L. REv. 107 (1963); cf. Franklin, The Origins and Constitu-
tionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REv. 789 (1964).
'33 Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on
Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 140 (1963).
13 4 Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963). In this
case the criminal statute was used as a source of private remedies in a civil suit for
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privacy statute expressly provides for injunctive relief against anticipated
invasions.135 Under this provision, one court enjoined, on the eve of broad-
cast, a national network program because it found therein an invasion of
the plaintiff's interests. 36 Although the plaintiff's consent had been sought,
the consent he gave was legally insufficient under the statute. An eleventh-
hour injunction of this sort would be a harsh sanction even to the news-
paper or magazine publisher. Its effect on the broadcaster, whose air-
time is much more rigorously scheduled than the publisher's columns,
could be disastrous. Even where there may be doubt about the adequacy
of the remedies at law, the first amendment, with its abhorrence of prior
restraint, should permit the broadcast to proceed and relegate the plaintiff
to a subsequent suit for damages. Otherwise the trial court of one state
could easily deprive the entire national audience of the chance to watch
a program which might well not be actionable anywhere else.
The dangers which libel and privacy suits pose to the free discussion
of public issues on the air have not gone unnoticed. With a prescience
characteristic of all 'his writing, Zachariah Chafee once warned of the
effect that heavy liability might have upon the tendency toward self-
censorship in the newer media.13 7 Recently the courts have echoed a
similar concern. "Courts must be careful," warns one recent Connecticut
decision, "not to permit the law of libel and slander to encroach un-
warrantedly upon the field of free public debate."' 38 With reference to the
broadcaster's obligation to gather and present material of vital public
interest, a federal district judge has warned that "courts should not, by
their judgments, hamper or discourage full and free discussion of public
business or circumstances connected with it."'3 The point has been made
elsewhere but these illustrations will suffice. Thus even where the New
York Times decision supplies no complete privilege to the broadcaster, the
first amendment should at least deter any court asked to grant criminal
or injunctive relief under state law against a broadcaster. And even where
the only claim is for damages, the strong public interest in untrammeled
presentation of the news and free discussion of current affairs should
caution against the award of excessive damages or, in some circumstances,
damages. For a criminal prosecution against a newspaper publisher under such a statute,
see State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
1' N.Y. Civ. RIrGHTs LAw § 51.
180 Durgom v. CBS, 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1961). This decision
was apparently never appealed, and it is not known whether or not the broadcast ever
occurred.
137 See CHA_, F=EE SPEEcH n-T THE UNT=rD STATEs 522 (1941).
138 Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 615, 116 A.2d 440,
445 (1955).
139 Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98, 107 (ED. Ky. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d
242 (6th Cir. 1958).
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against any liability at all. Finally, future cases may well extend the
New York Times doctrine beyond -the facts of that case to encompass
the whole field of public affairs discussion. 140 If the newspaper and maga-
zine publisher are eventually to enjoy such a broad privilege, there can be
no question that the broadcaster will share in its enjoyment.
B. The Broadcaster and the Communications Act: Federal Preemption
or Displacement of State Remedies
Few problems posed by the American federal system are more perplex-
ing than the federal preemption or supersession of state remedies. 4 ,
The problem arises in many contexts, but is particularly acute when
federal administrative regulation overlaps state tort law. Seldom does
a federal regulatory scheme completely displace state law. Yet the survival
of all state remedies could cripple any comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme. Between these two easy extremes lie the difficult cases. The
analytical challenge is to develop a framework that will resolve these
intermediate cases.
A few courts have suggested that Congress intended the Communi-
cations Act to occupy the entire field of broadcasting,142 but there is little
support for the suggestion either in the terms or legislative history of the
statute. The Supreme Court has recognized, for example, that the
states remain free to adjudicate various contract and property interests
indirectly affecting broadcasters,'14 although in so doing they must be
sensitive to possible abrasions with federal law. Thus the state courts
may enforce a contract for the sale of broadcasting time. 44 They may
not, however, decree specific performance of a contract for the sale of
a radio station where such transfer has been forbidden by the FCC.'4 5
Except for such easy cases, however, the line between federal regula-
tion and state remedies was badly blurred until 1963. On the last day of
140 See Pedrick, supra note 131, at 599.
141 In view of the substantial amount of litigation, and the obvious importance of the
question, there has been remarkably little scholarly writing about federal preemption of
state remedies. The best recent treatment seems to be Note, Pre-Emption as a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. Rav. 208 (1959).
142 E.g., Allen B. Dumont Labs. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Standard
Radio & Television Co. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 182 Cal. App. 2d 293, 6 Cal. Rptr. 246
(1960).
143 See Note, State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73 HAav. L. Rav. 386, 400-01
(1959).
144 See, e.g., ABC v. American Mfrs.' Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 939, 249 N.Y.S.2d 481
(Sup. Ct. 1963); Southwest States, Inc. v. Woodard, 379 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
145 Compare, e.g., Regents of N.M. College v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158
F.2d 900, 905 (10th Cir. 1947), with Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Carroll, 338 U.S.
586 (1950).
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its 1962 Term, buried between important antitrust cases and decisions
involving school prayers and Bible reading, the Court made its most im-
portant pronouncement to date on the federal-state relationship in radio
and TV broadcasting. The case involved an appeal by a broadcaster
from a New Mexico Supreme Court decision sustaining an injunction
against any advertising of eyeglass prices and certain other information,
over the air. 46 Such advertising was clearly forbidden by a general
state law.147 The state court had rejected claims of preemption under
both the Federal Communications Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act, and dismissed the broadcaster's challenge under the commerce clause
and the first amendment.
The Supreme Court, in Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners,'48
unanimously affirmed the New Mexico judgment. Mr. Justice Stewart,
writing for eight members of the Court, began by disposing easily of the
commerce clause claim. Then he turned to more difficult questions under
the Communications Act. The field of broadcasting, in the Court's view,
did not inherently require national uniformity of regulation in all matters.
Thus state law would be displaced by federal law only to the extent
there was "such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation
that both cannot stand in the same area, [or] evidence of a congressional
design to preempt the field."'149 In the issue of the eyeglass price adver-
tising regulation, the Court found neither actual conflict nor preemptive
intent.
It was conceded that the Federal Communications Commission held
extensive power in "passing upon the fitness of an applicant" to broadcast
in "the public interest, &onvenience and necessity."'81 0 It was also clear
that this power might include some consideration of a broadcaster's ad-
vertising practices. Nevertheless, to Justice Stewart, "the nature of the
regulatory power given to the federal agency convinces us that Congress
could not have intended. . . to supplant all the detailed state regulation
of professional advertising practices, particularly when the grant of
power to the Commission was accompanied by no substantive standard
other than the 'public interest, convenience and necessity.' ,,151 What the
14 6 New Mex. Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Roberts, 70 NWM. 90, 370 P.2d 811
(1962).
14 7 NW. STAT. § 67-7-13 (1953). Almost 30 other states had similar statutes at the
time. See Head v. New Mex. Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 426 n.3 (1963).
148 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
149 Id. at 430. The Court here quoted from an earlier decision of the same term, Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963). The Court there found
state regulations of the maturity of avocados not to have been preempted or superseded
by various federal agricultural marketing provisions.
15048 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1958).
151374 U.S. at 431.
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Court presumably meant by the "nature of the regulatory power" was the
FCC's authority to cancel or revoke broadcast licenses, a drastic sanc-
tion quite disproportionate to minor infractions such as advertising
irregularities, and for that reason ineffective in dealing with such mat-
ters.'52 Because of the Commission's apparent inability or disinclination
to regulate the practices with which the 'New Mexico statute was con-
cerned, the Court doubted that "Congress has ousted the States from
an area of such fundamentally local concern." Nor was there an actual
conflict between the two regulatory schemes: State law in no way im-
paired the full implementation of the federal regulatory objectives, there
being "no specific federal regulations even remotely in conflict with the
New Mexico law . ,,15
Mr. justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, agreed with the Court's
conclusion but expressed his own reasons. At the outset he noted that
the FCC's regulatory powers were no longer confined to the drastic
"death sentence," concededly inappropriate for advertising abuses and
other minor infractions. The Communications Act had been amended
in 1960 so as to equip the Commission with more appropriate sanctions,
including short-term license renewals and the power to exact money
"forfeitures" (fines, in effect) for violations insufficient to warrant the
termination of a license.154 Thus the issue before the Court ought to be
framed more precisely than the majority had done.
Moreover, the FCC had "concerned itself with the content of radio
advertising almost from the time that federal regulation of commercial
broadcasting began."' 55 Thus the question of federal preemption or
supersession could not turn either on any supposed lack of appropriate
sanctions or -of "any want of authority in the Commission to regulate
the subject matter of the New Mexico statute."'56 The solution must
come instead from a careful application of the criteria which generally
determine questions of federal preemption.
152 See SmEAD, FREEDOM o SPEEcH BY RADIO AND TELEVISION 3, 30 (1959); 2 SocoLow,
TBE LAW OT RADIO BROADCASTING 1005 (1939); Note, Broadcast Licensee's Past Conduct
as a Determinant of the Public Interest, 23 U. PIT'. L. R-v. 157, 160 (1961). See also the
comment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No.
1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1960).
153374 U.S. at 432.
154§ 503(b), added by 74 Stat. 894 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. V, 1964);
§ 307(d), added by 74 Stat. 889 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (Supp. V, 1964). In the 1960
amendments Congress also strengthened the Commission's cease and desist order powers,
§ 312(b), added by 74 Stat. 893 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (Supp. V, 1964). On the
scope and nature of these 1960 amendments, see generally Comment, Enforcement Provi-
sion of the Communications Act, 18 FE.. Comr. B.J. 45 (1963).
155 374 U.S. at 437 (concurring opinion).
156 Ibid.
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There was first of all, as Justice Stewart had said, nothing inherent
in the nature of broadcasting which required national uniformity of regu-
lation. The second question was one of congressional intent whether
the statute or the legislative history revealed a legislative design to oc-
cupy the entire field or that part of it involved in the case. In the text
and background of the Communications Act Justice Brennan found
neither. Congress had in fact manifested at several points its under-
standing that state law should survive for the most part. The statute
containing a saving clause preserving "the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute."57 And by contrast to federal regulation of other
communication media, the telephone and telegraph, the supervision of
broadcasting was quite shallow.158 Finally, there were detailed federal
statutes dealing with other broadcasting matters (obscene, indecent or
profane language, 159 fraudulent communications,00 deceptive adver-
tising,'' rigged quiz shows'62 and "payola,"' 63 among others). Such
particularity elsewhere suggested rather clearly that Congress had not
meant to oust all state power to deal with nondeceptive advertising.
A third criterion of federal preemption had still to be considered:
Was there an actual conflict in operation between the state and federal
laws? Here again Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's conclusion,
but offered narrower and more precise reasons. Unlike the case of po-
litical equal-time broadcasts, 164 in which the Court had already held state
law superseded because of conflict with the Communications Act,'65 there
was no conflict here. The purposes of state and federal action in the
field were wholly different. Moreover, the FCC had suggested to broad-
casters that one measure of responsibility to the "public interest" stand-
ard was the degree of compliance with state and local regulations of com-
mercial advertising. 66 The National Association of Broadcasters, sensitive
to federal-state conflicts, had taken essentially the same position.167
Finally, it seemed unlikely as a practical matter that the FCC could
'57 § 414, 48 Stat. 1099 (1934),, 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1958).
158 See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1959); FCC
v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1958).
160 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958).
6115 U.S.C. §§ 45, 54(b) (1958).
162 § 509, added by 74 Stat. 897 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. V, 1964).
163 § 508, added by 74 Stat. 896 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 508 (Supp. V, 1964).
164 Required by § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934). as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. V,
1964).
165 Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
166 See Letter of Acting Chairman Paul A. Walker to Senator Edwin C. Johnson,
Aug. 11, 1949, 5 RADro REG. 593, 594.
167See NATIONAL ASS'N or BROADCAsTERs, THr TELEviSION CODE 14 (8th ed. 1963);
NATIONAL Ass'N or BRoADcAsESs, THE RADIO CODE (9th ed. 1962).
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police minor advertising infractions even if it were disposed to do so.
Thus no conflict -had been demonstrated and the particular state regula-
tion should be upheld.
The lessons of the Head case for our present inquiry are several.
First was the insistence, in which all Justices concurred, that claims of
preemption in the broadcasting field would be resolved by particular ap-
plication of general principles to the precise facts of each case. Equally
important was the Court's rejection, also unanimous, of a test proposed
by the Solicitor General in a brief as amicus curiae. He had urged reversal
on the theory that advertising regulation should be left entirely to the
FCC.168 A statute of this sort was distinguished from the application of
traditional tort and criminal remedies which, in the Solicitor General's
view, survived the enactment of the Communications Act even though
they might more drastically affect the broadcaster's activities than an
injunction against a certain kind of advertising. The Court gave rather
short shrift to the "traditional tort and crime" test: "We can find no
material difference," said Justice Stewart, "with respect to the less 'tra-
ditional' statutory violation here involved.' 1 69 The real significance of
the Court's rejection of the tort-crime test appears from other parts of
both opinions. What was important in determining survival of state court
remedies against the broadcaster was clearly not the source of the state's
power to regulate. The crucial element, instead, was the practical effect
of a particular sanction on the broadcaster and on the whole scheme of
federal regulation. Thus some remedies which were not rooted in the
tort or criminal law might survive, on basically the same theory that
upheld the state's power to curtail eyeglass price advertising. Conversely,
certain other remedies which derived from "traditional" tort and criminal
law might yield if, on careful examination of their nature and effect, there
was evidence either of a congressional intent to displace them or of a
conflict with the Commission's activities. This test is surely not simple
of application, but it represents a cautious and sensitive approach to a
complex problem of interaction between federal and state law.
The picture is complicated by one other case in which the Supreme
Court did find state law displaced by the Communications Act. That is
the case of the broadcaster's liability for defamation during a broadcast
he was compelled to carry under the "equal-time" provision.Y°0 This
1 6 8 The brief argued at some length that "the state court's injunction intrudes upon the
federal scheme," because the application of state regulations like the one at bar might
"cause direct and substantial interference with this interstate medium of communica-
tion . . . ." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 27-34, Head v. New Mex.
Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
169 374 U.S. at 431.
17o§ 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. V, 1964).
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section of the Act provides that a broadcaster who makes his facilities
available to one candidate for a political office must furnish to other
candidates for that office broadcasting opportunities which are equal in
all respects. The provision was part of the original Communications Act
of 1934, and had a predecessor in the Act of 1927.171 But until 1959,
when the Court resolved the issue, there had been great uncertainty, in
the courts and in the Commission, on two questions: (1) Whether a
station had the power to censor material in an equal-time script or speech
that was clearly defamatory; 172  (2) If not, or when the defamation
came by way of impromptu remarks, whether the broadcaster could re-
sist liability on the ground that federal law compelled him to carry the
broadcast. State courts had resolved these questions differently,173 and
the Commission had not spoken decisively.174 Although many state legis-
latures had conferred a special immunity for equal-time broadcasts, lia-
bility remained a distinct threat in other states, including North Dakota,
whence came the 1959 case.
In Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v. WDA Y,1 5 a
sharply divided Supreme Court agreed with the North Dakota court that
federal law implicitly required an immunity for the broadcaster who in-
171 Federal Radio Act, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170 (1927).
172 See, e.g., Friedenthal & Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political
Broaddesting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HnAv. L. Rav. 445, 478-80
(1959); Comment, 1 U. FIA. L. Rav. 343, 355 (1948); Note, 32 So. CA.L. L . REV. 71 (1958).;
cf. Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by Political
Candidates, 39 VA. L. Rav. 303, 313-14 (1953). Apparently the practice of the broadcasting
industry during these uncertain years was to suggest changes to the speaker where
defamation was feared; apparently the speaker usually complied with the suggestion. But
if he did not, the broadcaster could not avoid carrying the speech, however clearly it might
be a source of potential tort liability. See Note, Broadcaster's Immunity From Liability for
Political Defamation, 48 GEO. L.J. 544, 556 (1960). If the station on its own deleted material
in the script which it believed to be dearly defamatory, that raised further problems on
which the law was uncertain. See De Grazia, Equal Political Defamation for All:
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, 20 GEo. WAsHr. L. Rav. 706, 720 (1952).
173 Compare, e.g., Daniell v. Voice of New Hampshire, 10 RAmio RE. 2045 (N.H.
Super. Ct. 1954)1; Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), with, e.g., Lamb
v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), aff'd, 274 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1960); Joseph-
son v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942);
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
174 The Commission did not speak dearly on the question until 1948. See In re Port
Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948). It suggested there in a strong dictum
that the broadcaster would not be liable for carrying a program required to be
carried under § 315. That dictum was sharply criticized by at least one court, although the
statement was never judicially reviewed. Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp.
199 (S.D. Tex. 1948). Uncertainty persisted in the wake of the Port Huron declaration,
and the FCC did little to clarify the Port Huron doctrine during the next few years. See
Note, 4 BAYILOR L. RaV. 516 (1952); Note, 61 YAa L.J. 87 (1952).
175360 U.S. 525 (1959).
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voluntarily carried defamatory political matter. Having decided that the
statute permitted no censorship of the script, even where it obviously
contained actionable material, the Court turned to the heart of the case.
Although the legislative history was silent, and might even have sug-
gested that Congress meant to leave state law intact, a majority of the
Court could not "reach a result which seems so in conflict with traditional
concepts of fairness."'1 76 Broadcasters might, of course, insure against
liability for political defamation, or avoid the equal-time law altogether
by carrying no candidate's speeches. But the whole purpose of that law,
"to facilitate political debate over radio and television," would be
frustrated if fear of heavy damages forced stations to shun political in-
volvement. 77 Thus, to the majority, Congress must have meant to con-
fer an immunity in order -to make the equal-time provision effective.
This judgment with respect to legislative intent made it unnecessary,
of course, to consider the effect of the obvious practical conflict between
federal and state law. The four dissenters, who disagreed on the matter
of congressional intent, did reach that question but minimized the con-
flict. The dissenters, beginning with the doubtful premise that a station
could not be liable without proof of intent to defame, 78 suggested that
-the North Dakota courts might well have found no liability under state
law, quite apart from the intent of Congress. But even if that were not
so, said Justice Frankfurter, "there is not that conflict between federal
and state law which justifies displacement of state power."'.17 The effect
of state libel suits was not, as the majority had suggested, to prohibit
broadcasters "from airing speeches by political candidates," but only
to "make such broadcasts potentially less profitable" even if insurance
and indemnification were available.8 If there was something unfair
about saddling the broadcaster with liability he could not avoid, that was
no more inequitable than turning away an injured plaintiff without re-
dress for no fault on his part. Finally, the dissenters would leave the
immunity question up to Congress, which had repeatedly failed to act.
Against this background, it was not for the Court to do what the legis-
lators would not do.
These, then, are the two cases that bear most closely upon the ques-
176 Id. at 533.
17 7 Id. at 534.
178 Id. at 542 (dissenting opinion). "It is to be noted initially that since defamation
is generally regarded as an intentional tort, it is a solid likelihood that the North Dakota
courts would conclude that WDAY's compelled broadcast of Townley's speech lacked
the necessary intent to communicate the defamation, and that therefore WDAY's conduct
was not tortious, or, if prima fade tortious, that WDAY was privileged."
179 Id. at 544 (dissenting opinion).
180 Ibid.
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tion of federal preemption of state tort suits against the broadcaster.
Our present inquiry begins where WDA Y left off. The central question
is whether the courts ought to recognize any privilege or immunity
under federal law where the offending broadcast is not strictly required
by the Communications Act. There is nothing in WDA Y which precludes
an extension of its holding; the majority nowhere indicated that a con-
flict between federal and state law might not be found even without the
presumed Congressional intent which had decided that case in favor of
immunity.181 It is appropriate, then, to explore some contexts in which
such conflict may exist, and then to consider whether any of these lesser
conflicts would justify the partial displacement of state law.
1. The FCC and State Tort Law Violations
A radio or television broadcaster receives his license on condition that
he serve the "public interest, convenience and necessity."' 8 Failure to
do so may result in loss of the license at the end of its term. 3 Serious
departures from this standard, or persistent violations of the major com-
mands of the statute, may even result in the revocation of a license before
it expires.8 4 These sanctions are obviously severe, and few broadcasters
lose their licenses. Since its establishment, the FCC has regulated more
effectively "by raised eyebrow" than by use of -the "death sentence." '185
1 8 1 Even after the decision of the WDAY case, many issues arising under § 315
remained to be considered and debated. See Harum, Federal Occupation of Political
Defamation, 49 A.BA.J. 1096 (1963); Erbst, Equal Time for Candidates: Fairness or
Frustration?, 34 So. CAi. L. REv. 190 (1961); Comment, Should Political Broadcasting
Be Fair or Equal?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 63 (1961). In addition, the section was amended
the following year because of a very strict interpretation announced and adhered to by
the FCC. The amendment was the so-called "news clip" provision which exempted from
the equal-time mandate certain incidental appearances of political candidates on newscasts,
news documentaries and interviews, 73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (Supp. V, 1964).
See Note, Radio and Television Appearances of Candidates for Office: Amended Section
315 of the Communications Act, 69 YALE L.J. 805 (1960); 73 HAv. L. Rtv. 794 (1960).
182 § 307(a), 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1958).
183 See KWK Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 337 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Robinson v. FCC,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n,
62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm'n,
47 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
184 The FCC has power to revoke as well as to refuse renewal of a broadcast license,
48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958).
185Note, Broadcast Licensee's Past Conduct as a Determinant of the Public Interest,
23 U. Pnrr. L. Rav. 157, 170 (1961). One observer notes that "the licensing power of the
FCC hangs like a Damocles' sword over broadcasting ... "' Schwartz, Antitrust and the
FCC: The Problem of Network Dominance, 107 U. PA. REV. 753, 769 (1959). Thus
informal warnings and suggestions to broadcasters are usually sufficient to ensure compliance,
see WoL, AnU xs uSTRATm LAW: THE IlOxu AL PROCESs 139 (1963); and speeches and
informal statements by individual commissioners have a profound effect on the behavior
of the industry, see Note, Television Programming, Communication Research, and the
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Since 1960 the Commission has been able to police lesser infractions with
less drastic sanctions of cease and desist orders, short-term license re-
newals, and of imposition of money forfeitures. 8 These sanctions have
been imposed occasionally for improper programming as well as for the
more frequent technical violations. 187
Under the general rubric of "public interest" the FCC undoubtedly
has power to consider flagrant violations of state tort law in appraising
the performance of a licensee. Indeed, even before the present Communi-
cations Act at least one license was revoked primarily because of repeated
and extreme instances of defamation directed both at groups and at
individuals. 8 8 Since that time, however, the Commission appears only
once to have taken defamation into account in a licensing proceeding,
and only indirectly at that.'89 So while the Commission undoubtedly
FCC, 23 U. PrrT. L. Rzv. 993, 996 (1962). Another observer notes that "indirect means,
such as letters of advice and statements of policy are more common" than formal sanctions
where broadcasting practices are thought by the Commission to be contrary to the
public interest. Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701,
703 (1964).
186 See statutes cited notes 159-63 supra.
187 See proceedings reported in 28 FCC ANNc. REP. 46-48 (1962); 29 FCC ANN. REP.
49-51 (1963); 30 FCC AN. REP. 54-55 (1964).18 8 Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1932). See In re Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 Pac. 481 (1930), involving contempt
proceedings against the broadcaster.
189 In Bellingham Pub. Co., 6 F.C.C. 31, 32 (1948), the Commission denied the
application of a newspaper publisher for a broadcast station license. One of the grounds
for the hearing examiner's rejection of the application, later affirmed by the full Com-
mission, was the presumably defamatory nature of some editorials the publisher had
injected into local political controversies. The examiner found that such publications
contained "numerous articles reflecting upon the honesty and integrity of public officials
and upon the morals and private lives of the citizens of Bellingham"; and that such
material was a "source of discord and dissension inimical to the general welfare of the
community." Before the Commission the applicant claimed that judgment of such material
was more appropriate for the courts than for an administrative agency, but the Commis-
sion found the evidence quite relevant to the broadcast application. "That course if
extended to radio broadcast service would have a definite relation to the public in-
terest .... ." See also Bellingham Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 159, 172 (1940).
There are other cases in which some consideration appears to have been given to
possibly defamatory conduct on the part of broadcast licensees or applicants for licenses.
For example, in Independent Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 193 F.2d 900, 902 (D.C. Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952), the court of appeals affirmed the Commission's
denial of two license applications resting partly on the grounds of misrepresentation and
failure to make full disclosure concerning the applicant's "behavior." The court observed,
in finding support for the Commission's judgment on this point, that the record "contained
information showing not only that... [the applicant) had been intemperate in his writings,
sermons and broadcasts, but that he was an expert in vituperation and vilification."
Recently the Commission granted the Broadcast Bureau's request for an evidentiary
hearing on applications for a television channel in Oregon. In passing, it reported the
Bureau's serious concern that one of the applicants had engaged in persistent defamation
during editorial broadcasts, but declined to pass on the Bureau's charge in the absence
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has the power to police defamation, the fact is it has seldom used that
power. 9 ' On the other hand, in time the new intermediate sanctions con-
tained in the 1960 amendments may revive the Commission's interest
in defamatory broadcasting,' 9 ' an interest probably previously chilled
because of the severity of the remedy.
of more specific allegations. By reference to the Oregon statutes governing libel and slander,
however, the Commission suggested that proof of such allegations would be highly relevant
to the applicant's qualifications. However, in the absence of "a showing as to factual
inaccuracy in the broadcasts, the question of whether ... [the applicant] showed a wanton
disregard of the facts is not presented." In re Application of Willammette-Land Television,
Inc., No. 13748, FCC, Feb. 19, 1962.
Recently the FCC has been considering numerous objections to the transfer of a
Pennsylvania radio station to a religious group headed by the controversial Reverend Carl
McIntire. Various protesting groups have charged that Dr. McIntire's attacks on certain
religious groups, his strong views on the United Nations and civil rights, and the like,
make him unfit to control a broadcasting outlet. The FCC entertained arguments by various
religious groups, labor organizations, and such civil rights and civil liberties groups as
the NAACP and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. See FOI Digest, Jan.-Feb.
1965, p. 6. But the Commission has recently concluded that the complaints are insufficient,
in view of the applicant's expressions of good intentions and promises to serve the public
interest. Thus the Commission declined to deny an initial license on the basis of these
charges. In re Application of Borst, No. 65-207, FCC, March 19, 1965.
Finally, the FCC has issued at least one stern warning to a broadcaster engaged in
activities that might be defamatory and which did in fact eventually give rise to several
defamation suits. Early in 1961 the Commission received several complaints about certain
episodes of "The Untouchables." For example, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons objected that the program misled viewers by purporting to recreate the facts of
the transfer of Al Capone from Atlanta to Alcatraz, when in fact most of the episode was
fictional. In response to these complaints the Commission admonished the American Broad-
casting Co. to be wary of creating "erroneous impressions with respect to programming
represented as being factual in character." Such misimpressions might, suggested the Com-
mission, violate the "public interest" standard. "This is doubly true," the letter added,
"where the result is to damage the reputations of identifiable individuals or groups." FCC
Public Notice-B, Rep. No. 3919, Sept. 28, 1961. Apparently nothing further came of these
complaints at the administrative level, but the very episodes to which the letter referred
gave rise to the successful defamation suit in American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,
Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962).
190 For suggestions that the FCC does have such power, see Summit Hotel Co. v.
NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 202, & A.2d 302, 311 (1939); Caldwell, Legal Restrictions on the Contents
of Broadcast Programs, 9 Am L. Rxv. 229, 248 (1938)1; Graham, Defamation and Radio,
12 WAsH. L. REv. 282, 292-93 (1937); Haley, The Law on Radio Programs, 5 GFo. WAsH.
L. REv. 157, 189-90 (1937); 47 McH. L. Rnv. 722, 723 (1949); 1 J. RAmo LAw 362, 367
(1931).
191 There has been a recent resurgence of interest on the part of the Commission, and
of its observers and critics, in the subject of control or regulation of program content.
Among the important recent cases are KWK Radio, Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1039 (1963), aff'd per
curiam, 337 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963),
aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Immaculate Conception
Church of Los Angeles v. FCC, 320 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1963); In re Application of
Pacifica Foundation, No. 45386, FCC, Jan. 22, 1964. Many materials and arguments in
support of the FCC's authority are collected in FCC, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine
in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 FED. Rao. 10415 (1964);
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The mere fact that the FCC can and does consider defamation in
license proceedings would not, of course, displace state law. As Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan pointed out in the Head case, the Commission has similar
powers with respect to the advertising practices proscribed by the New
Mexico law, but that alone was no reason for preemption. Unless the
intent of Congress was to preempt, there must be an actual conflict; the
effect of the state law must be to impede seriously the work of the federal
agency. So the present question is whether the state law of defamation
or of invasion of privacy could pose such a conflict.
2. The Broadcaster's Duty to Engage in Controversy
The answer to this question requires a consideration of the obliga-
tions the broadcaster incurs when he promises to serve the public in-
terest. One of his most important responsibilities, long recognized and
vigorously enforced by the FCC, is to present a fair and balanced sur-
vey of important public issues. 92 That means more than simply carrying
regular news reports, and panel discussions and interviews when he
chooses. It means at least that the broadcaster may not cut his station
off from discussion of the pressing issues of the day. Moreover, in pre-
senting those issues, he must offer both, or all, points of view in rough
balance. 9 3 Thus the broadcaster must obviously carry some material
he may disagree with and might avoid if the choice were completely
his, or if he were running a newspaper or magazine rather than a regu-
Rosenblum, Authority of the Federal Communications Commission, in FREEDOM & REsPON-
sIrBLrry n BROADCASTING 96 (Coons ed. 1961). But the whole question of just where the
FCC stands on 'the general issue of network program control is still very much in doubt.
See Broadcasting, March 8, 1965, p. 70.
192 See generally FCC, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 FED. REG. 10415 (1964); SMEAD, FREEDOM
OF SPEECH BY RADIO AND TELEVISION 45-63 (1959).
193 Originally the Commission held that broadcasters could not editorialize at all,
Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1941). Eight years later the Com-
mission modified this view and held that editorializing was permissible, so long as broad-
casters gave fair treatment to all controversial issues. See "Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees," 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1253 (1949). Recently the equal-time law has been amended so
as to impose upon every broadcaster an obligation "to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 73 Stat. 557 (1959),
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (Supp. V, 1964). There is some question whether this 1959 proviso
simply codifies a preexisting obligation of the broadcaster, or creates a new substantive
obligation. See Note, 69 YALE L.J. 805, 812-15 (1960). On the development of this doctrine
through its earlier stages, see Comment, Mayflower Rule-Gone But Not Forgotten, 35
CoRNxL L.Q. 574 (1950); Note, Radio Editorials and the Mayflower Doctrine, 48 CoLum.
L. REv. 785 (1948); Note, The Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled, 59 YALE L.J. 759 (1950). For
the interesting and important views of the National Association of Broadcasters on the
application of the fairness doctrine to the broadcasting of controversial issues, see NATIONAL
Ass'IN oF BROADCASTERS, Pouric. BROADCAST CATECHISM 15-16, 28 (4th ed., rev. 1964).
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lated and licensed facility. He may even be obligated to carry material he
fears will involve him in lawsuits. 94
Two specific recent examples may illustrate the general point. Politi-
cal broadcasting seems a good starting point. The equal-time law only
requires the broadcaster to provide time to a candidate when the station
has already allotted air time to an opponent. Thus it has been suggested
that the broadcaster could avoid political defamation by staying out of
campaigns altogether.' 5 The Commission, however, has more than once
suggested that a broadcaster jeopardizes his license by hiding from
politics. 0' Consideration of the public interest necessarily involves some
attention to political issues and campaigns. It is really no answer, there-
fore, to say that the broadcaster is legally obligated only to carry the
speech of the second and successive candidates, but not that of the first
candidate who comes to him. The obligation is of a different degree, and
is of course not specifically enforceable by a rejected candidate. 97 But
it is nonetheless an obligation which federal regulation imposes to some
degree on every broadcaster.
Another current example will underscore the legal dilemma in which
194 The FCC has recently suggested that there is an affirmative obligation to seek out
and discuss controversial issues as they may arise, Rollins Broadcasting, Inc., 34 F.C.C.
1, 81-82 (1963). See Note, 77 HtAv. L. :Ev. 701, 710 (1964).
195 See, e.g., Friedenthal & Medalie, supra note 172, at 476-77. There is some question
about the meaning that should be given to a sentence in § 315: "No obligation is imposed
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." Arguably this
provision, without more, would absolve the broadcaster from any responsibility to make
his facilities available for political activities.
196 See, e.g., Rollins Broadcasting, Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1, 82-83 (1963); cf. United Broad-
casting Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945); In re Rainey, 3 RADro REG. 737 (F.C.C. 1947)."
See also Friedenthal & Medalie, supra note 172, at 477-78 & n.198 (reporting a questionnaire
in which 777o of broadcasters surveyed felt they should have absolute discretion to
refuse any part in political broadcasting); Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for
,Defamatory Statements Made by Political Candidates, 39 VA. L. REv. 303, 307 (1953);
Developments in the Law--Defamation, 69 HaRv. L. REv. 875, 909-10 (1956)1; Note, Broad-
caster's Immunity From Liability for Political Defamation, 48 GEo. LJ. 544, 548 (1960);
Note, 69 YAa L.J. 805, 806 n.7 (1960); 24 So. CAL. L. Rav. 216, 217 (1951); 2 OxA. L.
Rav. 257, 258 (1949).
197 One court has recently held that § 315 does not create a private civil remedy in
favor of one who has been allegedly wronged by a broadcaster's refusal of equal time for
a political broadcast. Daly v. CBS, 309 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1962). Several state courts have
enforced contracts obligating a broadcaster to carry political speeches, without reference
to the possible impact of federal regulation, e.g., Rose v. Brown, 186 Misc. 553, 58 N.Y.S.2d
654 (Sup. Ct. 1945); but cf. Voliva v. WCBD Inc., 313 Ill. App. 177, 39 N.E.2d 685
(1942), in which the court refused to enjoin a station's insistence on a 48-hour advance
submission of scripts for political broadcasts. The remedy of a candidate who has been
refused equal time is, therefore, resort to the FCC, which may then exercise informal
sanctions and if those prove ineffective may turn to more formal methods of enforcement.
See Friedenthal & Medalie, supra note 172, at 488-89, noting that formal means of enforce-
ment may prove unsatisfactory because of the expense and delay they are likely to entail.
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the "public service" obligation may place the broadcaster. The FCC has
just begun to examine the way in which broadcasters have responded
to the civil rights controversy. The licenses of several stations in Missis-
sippi have recently come up for renewal. 198 Earlier the Commission
warned one of these stations that it might be acting contrary to public
interest in denying time to a Negro candidate for local office even though
the equal-time law clearly did not require such time.199 Now, the renewal
of these licenses has been opposed by various political, civic and labor
groups because of the stations' persistent refusal to discuss the civil
rights question at all, or at least to present it fairly when it was discussed.
The disposition of this case clearly indicates that the commission will
closely examine and carefully consider such charges in the future.2"
These and other recent cases indicate that the broadcaster is increas-
ingly obligated to carry material that may be offensive to him and in-
flammatory to the community. The chances that a jury in Mississippi
will find something defamatory in the speech of a Negro candidate or in
a frank panel discussion of civil rights seem greater than in the North
and West.210 Thus a vigorous application of the "public interest" criteria
may well force some broadcasters either to jeopardize their licenses by
198 As early as the spring of 1964, complaints were made that the two television stations
in Jackson, Mississippi had failed fairly and evenly to present and discuss issues relating to
civil rights. At this time it was reported that eight Mississippi broadcasters were under
investigation for suspected violations of the fairness doctrine in their coverage of the riots
at the University of Mississippi during the admission of Negro student James Meredith.
See Broadcasting, April 20, 1964, p. 44. The Mississippi AFL-CIO made similar charges later
in the spring, and formally opposed the renewal of one of the Jackson licenses. Broadcasting,
June 8, 1964, p. 66.
199 Lamar Life Ins. Co., 18 Radio Reg. 683 (F.C.C. 1959), discussed in FCC,
Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 FED. REG. 10415, 10418 (1964); Note, 77 HaRv. L. REV. 701, 710 (1964).
For earlier suggestions that broadcast licensees incurred some obligation to present civil
rights issues with particular fairness and balance, see Herbert Muschel, 33 F.C.C. 37, 40
(1962); New Broadcasting Co. (WLIB), 6 RaDIo REG. 258 (F.C.C. 1950).
200 On May 20, 1965, the FCC renewed for a one year probationary term the license of
a Jackson, Mississippi television station that had been charged with violating the fairness
doctrine in its coverage of civil rights issues. The American Civil Liberties Union, the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the United Church of
Christ had all urged the Commission to deny the station's application for license renewal. See
ACLU News Release, March 24, 1965; Broadcasting, March 1, 1965, p. 57. Among other
practices, the station was charged with having cut off part or all of certain programs that
advocated racial desegregation. Four members of the Commission concluded that a one-year
renewal and a formal warning to the station would suffice. Two members of the Commission,
including Chairman Henry, would have set the case down for a formal hearing leading to
possible cancellation of the license. See N.Y. Times, May 21, 1965, p. 1, col. 2; p. 36, col. 4.
201 For a vivid description of the position of jeopardy in which the southern press may
be placed by speaking out boldly on questions of civil rights, see Lyons, Liebling, Libel, and
the Press, The Atlantic, May 1964, p. 43, at 46-47.
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avoiding controversiality or risk heavy tort liability by engaging in con-
troversy. This dilemma suggests an important basis for the extension of
the federal immunity first recognized in WDA Y.
3. Bases of Immunity Under Federal Law
The law of broadcasting does not yet recognize any immunity beyond
the WDAY decision, and extension of that decision has not even been
considered. There has, however, been some litigation in other federally
regulated fields that suggests a basis for such an extension. One such
suggestive analogy comes from the labor field. Several courts have re-
cently held that the federal labor laws displace any recovery under state
defamation law for false statements made by a union official about his
employer during, and related to, a labor dispute over which the NLRB
has jurisdiction. 2 Although the courts recognize the inadequacy of
federal administrative relief against such defamation, they have none-
theless concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon203 leaves no room for state law
where the union's statements might constitute an unfair labor practice,
even though the Board has refused to act. 0 4 But the very breadth of the
Garmon test suggests why it does not apply to other regulated sectors
such as broadcasting. Federal preemption has gone much further in
labor relations than elsewhere. The Garmon doctrine finds no counter-
part in broadcasting.0 5 Thus, on analysis, this analogy provides a weak
basis for the extension of WDAY.
Much more apposite is the developing law concerning the liability
of airlines for damage resulting from noise and vibration near jet air-
ports. Several courts have refused, for example, to permit state law to
enjoin takeoffs and landings, even where the resulting noise may be
deafening and make life intolerable adjacent to the flight-paths 0 6 Build-
202 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964) ;
Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 NJ. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964); Schnell
Tool & Die Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 200 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio C.P. 1962). But see Brantley
v. Devereaux, 237 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C. 1965). See also 65 CoLumX. L. Rtv. 345 (1965).
203 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Sixth Circuit also relied upon the later Supreme Court
cases of Local 100, United Ass'n of journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690
(1963), and Local 207, Internat'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
204 The Sixth Circuit concluded that "if a Regional Director's refusal to issue a
complaint [against the defamation] is sustained by the Board's General Counsel as happened
in this case, the libelled individual is at the end of the remedial road." Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers Local 114, 337 F.2d 68, 72 (6th Cir. 1964).
205 See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 442-47
(1963) (concurring opinion); Note, State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73 HARv.
L. RFv. 386, 388-89 (1959).
20 6 Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956); City of
Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958) (declining the injunction
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ing from these cases it has been argued that the airlines should be
wholly immune from civil damage suits for noise and vibration losses,
although the airports would presumably remain liable.207 No court has
yet ruled directly on this contention. 0
The premise of this argument, however, applies imperfectly to
broadcasting. The conflict in the air noise context arises because the
flight paths are prescribed in detail by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, with safety considerations paramount. 9 Federal law would clearly
be flouted if a state court could order planes to land or take off on
paths other than those prescribed by the FAA, even if no federal agency
had specifically found the alternative routes to be less safe. 0 So the
injunctive cases are relatively easy, as would be the case of a state
court order purporting to enjoin a political speech which the equal-time
law compels a broadcaster to carry.
The question of the civil damage suit against the airline is harder,
however, and the result remains uncertain until such a case arises.
Awarding damages would not, of course, actually prevent the airline
from serving -the community. It would only, to paraphrase Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's WDAY dissent, make the airline's operations "potentially
less profitable" (or unprofitable).-"' Yet there are strong reasons both
in terms of the demands of federal regulation and in the balance of
public interests which might well warrant a federal immunity for air-
craft compelled to fly in pre-determined paths.
on grounds of CAB primary jurisdiction); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines,
Inc., 61 Cal 2d 582, 394 P2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964) (declining injunction not on
grounds of federal preemption but on balance of interests, including strong interest in
compliance with federal safety regulations governing flight-paths). Cf. Jankovich v. Indiana
Toll Road Comm'n, 379: U.S. 487, 493-95 (1965), finding no conflict with the Federal
Aviation Act in a state court decision awarding compensation for an alleged appropriation
of airspace rights of a toll road adjacent to an airport.
207See Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARV.
L. R~v. 1581, 1594-96 (1961); Brief of Allegheny Airlines as Amicus Curiae, pp. 8-18,
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
208The CAB presented this position in a brief as amcicus curiae in Gardner v.
Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955), but the question was not reached in that
case nor has it been reached in any subsequent decision. See Note, 74 HFAv. L. REV. 1581,
1594 n.100 (1961)L In the most recent case involving these issues, the California Supreme
Court expressly reserved the question of the possible effect upon a private damage suit of
its refusal to enjoin allegedly offensive and injurious overflights. See Loma Portal Civic
Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 590-91, 394 P.2d 548, 554, 39 Cal. Rptr.
708, 714 (1964).
209 See Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1581, 1595-96 (1961).
210See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir.
1956).
211 Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 544 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
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Whatever immunity these factors may confer upon the airlines,
however, they may be inapposite for the broadcaster who is effectively
compelled to carry controversial matter. Both the broadcaster and the
airline may presumably obtain insurance, but the airline has no equiva-
lent to the broadcaster's option of indemnity from the speaker or the
sponsor. There is no other party who is either more clearly at fault
or better able to bear the loss. More important is the broadcaster's
ability to pass on his losses by raising his advertising rates at will; the
airline's rates, by contrast, are subject to close and constant CAB
scrutiny. 12 Indeed, the radio and television broadcaster enjoys almost
complete freedom with respect to the setting of rates and other terms
and conditions of business; he is in this respect much freer than the
other media regulated by the FCC, telephones and telegraphs, whose
rates are under constant scrutiny.213 While this difference does not void
the airline analogy, it does suggest that a stronger case must be made
for the broadcaster's immunity under a similar theory.
There are other factors that argue against such an immunity for
radio and -television. For one, legislative history shows that Congress
has many times considered and rejected proposals for such an immunity,
at least with respect to equal-time political broadcasts.214 Of course
legislative inaction did not deter the Court in WDAY from taking the
step Congress declined to take, but this legislative context should at
least make the courts cautious in extending the immunity beyond the
WDAY situation. It is also relevant that the Communications Act
contains a comprehensive saving clause: "Nothing in this Act contained
212 Federal Aviation Act, §§ 403, 404, 72 Stat. 758-60 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1373 (Supp. V, 1964), § 1374 (1958).2 13 The principal differences arise because telegraphs and telephones are considered
common carriers, while broadcasters are not. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America,
358 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1959); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474
(1940).
2 14 There were strong attempts to incorporate such a provision in the Federal Radio
Act of 1926. As the original equal-time provision of that law passed the Senate, it
included a guarantee that a broadcaster compelled to carry a political speech "shall not
be liable to criminal or civil action by reason of any uncensored utterances thus broad-
cast." 67 CoxG. REc. 12502, 12505 (1926). Eventually the immunity proviso was removed,
however, either because of doubts about its constitutionality or because of a conviction
or assumption that no state would impose such a liability upon a broadcaster anyway. See
Memorandum for The United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 18-19, Farmers Educ. & Coop.
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). Many subsequent attempts were made to
amend such an immunity into the statute. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 17-21,
Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., supra (listing and brief description of all
pertinent proposals from 1927-1955). See also Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Re-
consideration, 34 IowA L. REv. 12, 38-40 (1948); De Grazia, Equal Political Defamation
for All: Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, 20 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 706,
712 & nA0 (1952).
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shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such
remedies." '215 The Aviation Act contains an identical saving clause,"'
but other regulatory statutes are less generous to the survival of pre-
existing remedies.
A further factor which militates against preemption is the FCC's
inability to award any form of relief to a private party injured by
defamation. While regulatory sanctions might be invoked against a
persistent defamer, there is even doubt whether a single defamatory
broadcast would give grounds to invoke the administrative machinery
against a broadcaster. Moreover, the Commission may award damages
only on complaints against "common carriers," a category which does
not include licensed broadcasters. Thus the inability of the regulatory
agency to redress private grievances further suggests the intended sur-
vival of remedies apart from the statute.21
7
On the other hand, the argument may prove too much. Federal pre-
emption would abrogate only a claim against the broadcaster, so that the
other parties responsible for the defamation would remain liable. Thus
the plaintiff might not be injured by the loss of one possible defendant,
or at least no more than if the broadcaster turned out to be judgment
proof. This contention is not persuasive, however, for several reasons.
First, the broadcaster is the one party in the picture who is least likely
to be judgment-proof; the FCC's rigorous control over the financial
responsibility of licensees is a good reason why this defendant ought
not to be taken away.21 Second, whatever his financial responsibility,
the broadcaster is the party most likely to have, and best able to
obtain insurance against defamation liability. Third, although the
speaker is always theoretically liable, he may often be difficult even to
identify,1 9 or he may be outside the jurisdiction of the courts of the
plaintiff's state, or he may be judgment-proof even if he is identified
and served in the state. 22 Finally, the liability of the other possible
defendants, the producer, the advertising agency, the sponsor and
others is uncertain, not only because of doubts about jurisdiction and
215 § 414, 48 Stat. 1099 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1958).
216 § 1106, 72 Stat. 798 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958).
217 Cf. Wills v. TWA, 200 F. Supp. 360, 364-65 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
218 See § 319(a)h 48 Stat. 1089 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 319(a) (Supp. V,
1964). Financial qualifications have been considered, e.g., Orange Belt Telecasters, 9 RAnxo
REG. 1002a (1954); EzERY, BROADCASTING & GovERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITIMS AND REou-
LATzONS 160-61 (1961).
2 1 9 See 1 J. RADio LAW 362, 365 (1931).
220 Compare Haley, The Law on Radio Programs, 5 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 157, 196
(1937), with Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 249,
266 n.49 (1940).
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venue, but also because the law respecting their liability is many years
behind that of the broadcaster's liability. Thus there seems no adequate
substitute for the broadcaster as the logical defendant. For all these
reasons it seems unlikely that courts will confer upon the broadcaster
a complete immunity from state tort law beyond that already recognized
in the WDA Y case.
4. Partial Federal Immunity for the Broadcaster
The failure to find a legal justification for complete immunity does
not dispose of the question. It may be possible to reconcile the interests
of injured plaintiffs with those of the broadcaster by recognizing certain
limited or partial immunities where some relief from state law is re-
quired by the scheme of federal regulation.
Several such situations come to mind. Recall, for example, the case
of the injunction under the New York privacy statute against a net-
work broadcast scheduled for the day following the court decision. 21
It may be, as has been suggested, that the injunction should have been
denied on First Amendment grounds. In any event, deference to
federal regulation would seem to require the plaintiff to wait until after
the broadcast and then press his claim for damages. The reasons for
this conclusion are similar to those which led the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit to find that the Communications Act displaced the
power of the states to censor movies scheduled to be shown on tele-
vision.Y2 The Act makes clear that the FCC has no such power of
censorship or prior restraint. With such authority expressly denied to
the federal agency, it would be perverse to allow a state agency or court
to exercise just such power. Thus, the court of appeals concluded, the
survival of state censorship powers would interfere with the FCC's
regulatory functions; "Program control was entrusted to the Federal
Commission and it is an effective one.12 An injunction against a net-
work broadcast based on the tort law of a single state would seem to
present a similar interference with the federal scheme and ought there-
fore to be refused on similar grounds. State injunctions against local
broadcasting of certain matter may, of course, present different issues;
the Head case involved, after all, a state court injunction against the
local dissemination on a single station of local advertisements.
A second situation in which a partial immunity might be recognized
is that of punitive damages under state law. While the awarding of
compensatory damages may make broadcasting less profitable, it may
221 Durgom v. CBS, 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
2 2 2 Allen B. Dumont Labs, Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950).
223 Id. at 156.
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not put many stations off the air. Punitive damages, however, could
have just that effect. The sting of punitive damage awards would seem
greatest in precisely those cases where the federal obligation to become
involved in politics and controversy would be felt most heavily-the
Mississippi station, for example, which presents a candid discussion of
civil rights in order to save its license. The fact is that more than one
small but courageous Southern newspaper has been seriously jeopardized
by extravagant punitive damages growing out of racial issues.224 That
fate should not be permitted to befall the broadcaster who enters the
dangerous waters only to comply with a federal mandate to serve the
public interest.
A third case warranting partial immunity may be that of criminal
remedies. Some states still have criminal libel laws, although their per-
missible scope under the Constitution has been drastically curtailed by
recent Supreme Court decisions.225 Other states have criminal sanctions
against such invasions of privacy as the broadcast of the names of rape
victims 2 ° Occasionally these sanctions have been applied to the broad-
caster, apparently without consideration of their possible conflict with
federal regulation.22 7 While a criminal prosecution for something said
on the air may not put the station or its owner out of business, the
sanction is still drastic. There are, moreover, several federal criminal
laws which apply specifically to broadcasting. 28 Their presence might
suggest, even in the absence of actual conflict, a federal design -to limit
the broadcaster's criminal liability to those precise situations. If every
state may superimpose its criminal sanctions on those of the federal law,
fear of jeopardy may deter the broadcaster from entering the very
areas on which serving the public interest places the greatest premium.
There are other situations in which the broadcaster may be partially
relieved of liability. State statutes on privacy and on broadcast defama-
tion vary considerably, as we have already observed. Writers have
continually remarked upon the patchwork of liability that confronts
2 24 See Lyons, supra note 201, at 47. In addition, recent developments suggests another
possible source of jeopardy for southern broadcasters who deal frankly with civil rights.
A Bogalusa, Louisiana station claims it has been the victim of a sponsor boycott instigated
by the Ku Klux Klan because of the station's participation in the sponsorship of an
address by former U.S. Representative Brooks Hays to a racially mixed audience in
Bogalusa. Although the address was cancelled, apparently because of community pressures
and "intimidation," the station's sponsors soon fell from 75 to 6. San Francisco Chronicle,
April 6, 1965, p. 26, col. 4.
225 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
226E.g., GA. CoDE ANw. § 26-2105 (1953); S.C. CoD ANN. § 16-81 (1962). One such
statute, Wis. STAT. AsN. § 942.02 (1958), has been sustained against a constitutional challenge,
in State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
2 2 7 Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963).
228 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1464 (1958).
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the interstate publisher. The broadcaster is in an even more perilous
position because of the uncertainty as to which states will receive his
signal on a particular day or at a given hour. Thus a strong argument
for federal immunity can be made in the case, for example, of a cleared
channel broadcaster whose federal license gives him a wide territory,
if his programs reach a single distant state where material that is pro-
tected everywhere else has been made actionable. The one state that
enacts bizarre laws on defamation or privacy or other communication
torts ought not be empowered to stifle the broadcasting of material
which is 'legal everywhere else.229 Of course, if the state that is out of
line happens to be the home of the key station, substantially different
questions are presented. For the moment we need go no further than
to consider the reach of a single deviant receiving state.
A strong case for an immunity can also be made out with regard to
educational television (ETV). There have apparently been no tort
suits against ETV stations yet. The liability of educational television
may be affected by federal regulation in two distinct ways: For one,
the FCC has been considerably more lenient with respect to -the financial
responsibility of ETV applicants than of commercial broadcasters.1 0
The purpose 'has been to encourage low-cost, non-profit presentation of
material that would probably never be broadcast if it were forced to
find commercial sponsors. Operation of this kind might be impossible
if ETV channels were subject to the same liabilities as the commercial
broadcaster. The other relevant aspect of federal regulation is the
recent appropriation by Congress of substantial funds for the further
development of educational television. The 1962 amendments to the
Communications Act are designed to assist, on a matching grant basis,
the "prompt and effective use of all educational television channels
remaining and available" and to bring ETV to areas of the country
which are not now served by this medium."' The direct federal partici-
pation in this objective might be frustrated by heavy 'tort liability under
state law, and some immunity might therefore be appropriate.
5. A Uniform Federal Standard of Broadcaster Liability
Even if federal law grants no general immunity to the broadcaster,
it is possible that federal law requires the application of a uniform
2 29 An analogous limitation on state regulation of radio and TV advertising was sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Brennan in Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry,
374 U.S. 424, 447 (1963) (concurring opinion); cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520 (1959).
230See, e.g., NTA Television Broadcasting Corp., 22 RADIo REG. 273, 291 (F.C.C.
1961).
231 § 392(d), added by 76 Stat. 65 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 392(d) (Supp. V, 1964).
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standard of tort liability. The courts have so held with respect to
defamation claims against telephone and telegraph companies. 2  The
ground for this holding is simply stated: "Congress having occupied the
field by enacting a fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation, it seems
clear that questions relating to the duties, privileges and liabilities of
telegraph companies in the transmission of interstate messages must be
governed by uniform federal rules." '233 It has been suggested that similar
reasoning should establish a uniform federal standard of liability for
the broadcaster.234
No court, however, has accepted the suggestion. It is not hard to
see why. The cases of the telegrapher and tie broadcaster are readily
distinguishable, despite their responsibility to the same federal agency.
The regulation of the -telegrapher is vastly broader; the jurisdiction of
the FCC covers many matters, such as the rates and conditions of
service, on which the broadcaster is entirely autonomous.28 As a com-
mon carrier, the telegrapher needs the assurance and the predictability
of a uniform federal standard for reasons that do not affect the broad-
caster's business.236 Then, too, there is a history of oppressive state
regulation of various aspects of telegraphy which made -the federal
standard of liability almost a necessity. Moreover, the federal common
law of defamation by telegraph was well developed when radio and the
FCC were still in their infancy. Finally, the successive Congresses which
have rejected proposals for a federal immunity for the broadcaster seem
to have simply assumed the continued applicability of -the variable state
law of defamation and related torts. 37
On the other hand, the kaleidoscopic variations of tort law from
state to state urge the enactment of a uniform federal broadcast defama-
tion law. Suggestions have been made in this direction,238 and the most
232 O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1940); see Smith,
Liability of a Telegraph Company for Transmitting a Defamatory Message, 20 COLum.
L. REV. 30, 369 (1920).
233 O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 232 at 541.
234 See Berry & Goodrich, Political Defamation: Radio's Dilemma, 1 U. FLA. L. Rv.
343, 352 (1948).
235 See Note, The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation and Invasion of Privacy,
60 EHsav. L. Rav. 941, 951 (1947).
236 See O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541-42 (1st Cir. 1940).
237 See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 36-38, Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of America v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
238 See, e.g., Keller, Federal Control of Defamation by Radio, 12 NoTRE DAME LAW.
15, 134 (1936-37); Korbel, Defamation by Broadcast: The Need for Federal Control, 49
A.B.A.J. 771 (1963); Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made
by Political Candidates, 39 VA. L. lEv. 303, 317 (1953); Note, Multi-State Libel and
Conflict of Laws, 35 VA. L. Rav. 627, 638-39 (1949)t; Note, Political Defamation by Radio
and the Federal Communications Act, 46 ILL. L. REV. 626, 635 (1951).
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recent proposal is expected to be introduced soon in the House of
Representatives." There seems little doubt that Congress has power
under the commerce clause to enact such legislation ancillary to its
regulation of broadcasting. Years ago the courts upheld the federal
statute that makes criminal certain obscene utterances on the air 40
There are numerous federal statutes that provide private remedies
against other types of regulated defendants2 4 These statutes, either
expressly or by implication, establish uniform federal standards of lia-
bility which govern suits in the state as well as federal courts. The
constitutionality of such statutes is widely assumed. One would be
amazed today to find any serious doubt about congressional power
respecting broadcast defamation.2
The more important question is what provisions such a federal law
ought to contain. All that can be done here is to list various matters that
should be considered in the drafting process. Perhaps the first issue
concerns the scope of such law, whether it should cover only the field
now covered by state law of defamation, or should also supersede state
privacy law (as to which the need for federal uniformity may be less
pressing). Attention ought then to be given to the "single publication"
problem. Undoubtedly an enlightened federal statute would incorporate
the single publication principle, and accompany it with a reasonable
limitation period essential to reinforce the principle of uniformity which
might be frustrated if the timing of litigation were left to state limita-
tion law.
There are other obvious matters that should be considered, such as
the persons who are covered, or exempted from liability. The speaker,
the broadcaster, the sponsor, the producer, the advertising agency and
others might all be dealt with more explicitly than state statutes have
yet done. As to each defendant, a standard of care ought to be pre-
scribed, conditioned perhaps on certain factors. For example, there
should be little doubt the speaker is always absolutely liable; perhaps
the broadcaster could be held absolutely liable for the torts of an
239 See Broadcasting, March 8, 1965, p. 5.
2 4 0 Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931).
2 4 1 The decision of the Supreme Court in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S.
1, 50 (1912), left little doubt that Congress had power under the commerce clause to reg-
ulate tort liability with respect to activities in interstate commerce. For other examples
of the exercise of this power, see, e.g., 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 '(1958)
(Federal Employers Liability Act); 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) (Clayton
Act); 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958) (Securities Exchange Act).
242 See Friedenthal & Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broad-
casting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72 HARv. L. REV. 445, 483-84 (1959);
Korbel, supra note 238, at 772; McDonald & Grimshaw, Radio Defamation, 9 Am L. REv.
328, 340-41 (1938) ; Note, Defamation bv Radio, 33 VA. L. REv. 612, 620 (1947).
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employee, liable for lack of due care in the selection of a scheduled
non-employee, and exempt in the case of a non-scheduled, non-employee
over whom he had no control.1
43
Privileges, defenses and immunities should also be dealt with. The
principle of WDAY, at least, should be codified. And some thought
should be given to some of the partial immunities discussed above in
the broadcasts compelled or dictated largely by federal law. The matter
of privileges might require more detail than the legislation is worth, and
because of the degree of uniformity that prevails in existing state law,
could perhaps be resolved by incorporating the applicable state law
by reference into the federal standards. On the other hand, it may be
that the federal common law developed in the telegraph and telephone
cases would be more suitable for this purpose. The question of re-
traction should not be overlooked. It seems unlikely that any method of
retraction could be devised that would be as effective as in newspaper
libel. In its place it might be appropriate to adopt some form of the
"right of reply" which has been used so successfully in many European
countries.
Some consideration should also be given to procedure and remedies.
Suits under the statute could perhaps be confined to the federal courts,
although there would seem no reason to exclude the state courts. A more
difficult question would arise with respect to an administrative remedy.
Some federal regulatory statutes give the agency power to award
damages, and the FCC already has such power with respect to certain
violations of the Act's express provisions.244 More thought would have
to be given before deciding whether to extend that power to violations
of -this proposed new law. Other remedial problems would arise with
respect to the damages that can be recovered, and specifically whether
a broadcaster ought to be immune from punitive damages, at least where
he has acted in accordance with the obligations of his license. Finally,
2 4 3 A suggestion might be to cover the case of a broadcaster who is neither insured
nor solvent at the time of a judgment against him by establishing a federal indemnity fund
to compensate the plaintiff who proves his case but has no other recourse. See Note, Censor-
ship of Defamatory Political Broadcasts: The Port Huron Doctrine, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv.
127, 140 n.77 (1959). The claims on such a fund would be infrequent in view of the FCC's
solicitude for the solvency of broadcasters, and the number of other potential defendants
in almost every case. The cost of such a fund would seem a small price for the assurance
that every case will be covered.
2 4 4 Under § 207, 48 Stat. 1073 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 207 (1958), the FCC shares with
the federal district courts jurisdiction over complaints and suits for damages against
common carriers subject to the Communications Act, based upon alleged violations of the
Act. The term "common carrier" excludes licensed radio and television broadcasters, with
the result that no provision is made in the Act for recovery of damages from broadcasters
on any ground.
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there should be some consideration given to criminal penalties. Although
many of the proposed federal broadcast defamation bills have in-
cluded criminal sanctions, it has not been shown that civil remedies
would be inadequate. Criminal libel laws are always suspect,245 and
unless compelling reason appears for their inclusion, an enlightened
federal law would seem happily rid of them. The federal prohibitions
of obscenity, fraud and the like on the air would presumably remain,
however, for they raise less serious questions under the first amendment.
C. The Broadcaster and the Law of Unfair Competition
Any discussion of the effect of federalism upon the broadcaster's tort
liability would be incomplete without some mention of unfair competi-
tion. The problem arises because state and federal law afford sometimes
overlapping, or even conflicting, protections to certain interests-princi-
pally to the broadcasts themselves or the subject matter of the broad-
casts. The conflict arises not only from the interaction of state law with
the Communications Act, but also with the federal Copyright Act. These
conflicts are rapidly becoming acute with the growth of community
antenna television.
Piracy of radio broadcasts has been a major problem almost since
the beginning of commercial broadcasting. The cases have fallen into
three general categories: First, there has been the actual appropriation
by one broadcaster of the raw material or actual subject matter to which
a competitor has acquired exclusive broadcasting rights. For example,
the pirate station may send a scout into a baseball park, or position
him atop the fence of a racetrack to gather information from which
to broadcast the results of the event without permission of the proprietor
or of the competing station. Several such cases have resulted in injunctions
against such allegedly unfair competition.246
A second kind of piracy involves the use of the actual broadcast
in competition with the live event. For example, the promoters of a
major boxing match or professional football game will often insist upon
a "blackout" in the vicinity of the event to increase the revenue at the
gate. 47 Alternatively, they may grant exclusive rights via closed circuit
245 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
246 E.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (WD.
Pa. 1938); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press Serv., Inc., 165
Misc. 71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds
Co. v. Taylor, [1937] Argus L.R. 597. But cf. National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc.,
24 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
2 47 The FCC has recently suggested that the "blackout" practice may be contrary
to the public interest because it deprives an important segment of the viewing and listening
audience of immediate access to sporting events which they cannot personally attend.
Paducah Newspapers, Inc., 1 RADIo REG. 2d 987 (FCC 1964).
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TV to one or more local movie theaters, permitting general radio and
television coverage only beyond a 100 mile radius. These arrangements
do not always prevent theaters and taverns with powerful antennas from
picking up the signal from outside the blackout area and piping the
broadcast in for the benefit of their patrons. In the few such cases
that have arisen, the courts have generally granted relief on grounds
of unfair competition. 248
The third type of piracy is more recent and more complex. With the
advent of community antenna television, there has been substantial
appropriation of network material from distant stations (by means of
tall and powerful antennas) which is then relayed to subscribers, in
competition with local stations that have network contracts for the
broadcast of the same material. The courts have just begun to deal
with this problem, and the results are still inconclusive.24 ' The un-
certainty is compounded by the FCC's reluctance to assert jurisdiction
over community antenna systems.25 °
1. Preemption Under the Communications Act
The application of state law of unfair competition to suits such as
these might be preempted by either of two bodies of federal law. First,
and less likely, there is a section of the Federal Communications Act
which forbids any broadcasting station to "rebroadcast the program or
any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express
authority of the originating station."25' This provision facilitates net-
248E.g., CBS v. Circle Bar & Grill, Inc., 20 RADIO REG. 2128 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1960);
cf. Mutual Broadcasting Sys. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct.
1941). In this connection it should be noted that the power of the states to regulate the
reception of television programs in public places such as bars and tap rooms, usually by
requiring special entertainment permits, has generally been sustained. See Mosey Cafe,
Inc. v. Helena Television, Inc., 125 U.S.P.Q. 595 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 1960); cf. Jackson v.
364 Pa. 361, 72 A.2d 85 (1950).
249 See Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964); Z Bar Net,
Inc. v. Helena Television, Inc., 125 U.S.P.Q. 595 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 1960); cf. Jackson v.
Hayward, 9 Utah 2d 136, 339 P.2d 1026 (1959). Many of the recent proceedings and
other developments in the CATV field are discussed in Note, Community Antenna Television:
Survey of a Regulatory Problem, 52 GEo. L.J. 136 (1963). One other case pertinent to
this discussion is Loeb v. Turner, 257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), in which the
court refused to enjoin one broadcaster's "recreation" of a stock car race in another state,
which was based upon a running commentary telephoned to the station by an agent who
was listening to the plaintiff's authorized broadcast from the racetrack.
250 It now appears that FCC regulation of community antenna systems is imminent,
although the terms and conditions of regulation are of course subject only to speculation.
See Broadcasting, March 29, 1965, p. 5; April 19, 1965, p. 60. See generally discussion
note 122 supra.
251 § 325(a), 48 Stat. 1091 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1958).
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work broadcasting by giving to the network's key or originating station
a limited monopoly in all its broadcasts." 2
It can be argued that this section displaced all state unfair competi-
tion law covering the same area. The contrary arguments seem over-
whelming, however. The statute prohibits only an appropriation by
another "broadcaster." Thus it clearly does not cover the case of the
theatre or tavern which picks up a broadcast and exploits it for profit
in the "blackout" region. Nor does it seem to apply to the community
antenna situation, because the community antenna service has never
been considered a "broadcaster" within the meaning of the Act.253 The
one court which has considered this question concluded, therefore, that
"community antenna services . . . are not required by the Act as pres-
ently written to obtain the consent of a broadcasting station before
picking up its signal and its programs.) 254
There remains the third case, that of the pirate station which peeks
through the sports-arena keyhole or sets up a fence-top booth overlook-
ing the racetrack. Here the defendant clearly is a "broadcaster." But the
statute still seems inapplicable because the misappropriation, albeit in
competition with another broadcaster, is not the rebroadcasting of "the
program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station ... ." Thus
by consideration of each of -the cases to which it might apply, it would
seem that nothing in the Communications Act displaces state law in un-
fair competition suits of this type involving broadcasters.
2. Preemption Under the Copyright Act
The possible preemptive effect of the federal copyright laws presents
a much harder question. A broadcaster's rights in his material, if legally
unpublished, may of course rest on a common law copyright. It is quite
clear that nothing in the federal law precludes the assertion of claims
based upon the common law copyright.255 But there is increasing doubt
whether a radio or TV broadcast heard or seen by millions should be
considered "unpublished,12 56 although that is still the general rule.2 5
252 See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 ELv. L. REv. 888, 946 (1964).
253 See Note, 52 GEo. LJ. 136, 143 (1963).
254 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47, 55 (D. Idaho 1962), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
255 Copyright Act, § 2, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964) .
256 See Krasnow, Copyrights, Performers' Rights and the March on Civil Rights:
Reflections on Martin Luther King, Jr. v. Mister Maestro, 53 GEo. L.J. 403, 416-19
(1965); Selvin, Should Performance Dedicate?, 42 CAnF. L. Rav. 40 (1954).
257 Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), aff'd, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936); King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 106-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); CBS v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d
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The difficult question, then, is how far the federal copyright laws
preempt the state law of unfair competition in suits between or involv-
ing broadcasters. It seems quite clear, at one extreme, that states may
not protect material which has been published, but without an attempt
to secure federal copyright protection. This conclusion rests upon a
basic principle that once the term of federal statutory protection has
expired, the states are powerless to extend that term under the common
law. 258
Until 1964, however, there was considerable doubt about the appli-
cation of this principle to material which was theoretically entitled to
federal protection but for some reason was not in fact protected. Last
year the Supreme Court decided two cases involving manufactured
articles which had been held unpatentable for lack of invention. Com-
petitors of the manufacturers had produced and marketed "chinese
copies" of the articles. Applying the state law of unfair competition,
the lower federal courts enjoined further sale of the copies.250 The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed, however, in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co.,26 ° and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 261
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, observed that the patent laws,
by conferring a limited monopoly on the inventor, had struck a balance
between rewarding the creator and preserving free competition. State
law could not frustrate or upset that balance. Thus, "to allow a State
by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an
article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be
to permit the State to block off from the public something which federal
law has said belongs to the public. . . . This would be too great an
encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated."20 2
Unquestionably these principles apply as much to copyright as
to patent protectioi. 26 3 Presumably, therefore, state unfair competition
law may not protect works for which federal copyright is available but
has not been obtained. But what of those works which fall within the
809, 811 (Sup. CL 1964). These cases are based upon the old leading case of Ferris v.
Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912), which held that the public performance of a play, no
matter how often repeated, did not constitute a publication divestitive of common law
copyright.
258 See Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co., 43 Fed. 450 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1890); cf. G.
Ricordi Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
259 Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).; Day-Brite
Lighting Co. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
260376 U.S. 225 (1964).
261376 U.S. 234 (1964).
262 376 U.S. at 231-32.
263 The Court so indicated at several places in its two opinions. See 376 U.S. at 231
n.7, 232-33.
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constitutional term "writings of an author" for which Congress has made
no provision in the Copyright Act? One author has argued that "Con-
gress' failure to provide protection should be interpreted as a de-
cision that there be no protection at all."26
This argument might suggest that state unfair competition protec-
tion is unavailable even for radio and TV broadcasts which are not
within the Copyright Act. It seems unlikely, however, that the Supreme
Court's recent decisions go so far. For in those cases the Court carefully
restricted its holding to articles that were not only covered by the Patent
Act, but for which patent protection had been sought and denied. To
extend that principle to the articles, or "writings" for which no statu-
tory protection is even theoretically available, would create a "no-man's
land" which is generally abhorrent to federal law.265 This extension
would leave the broadcaster remediless except to the limited extent that
the present interpretation of the Copyright Act, augmented by the Com-
munications Act, may afford statutory protection.
We have assumed to this point that statutory protection is un-
available for radio and TV broadcasts. It may be, however, that through
the medium of the videotape, copyright protection can be claimed for
much of the broadcaster's literary product.266 This would be the case
whether or not the showing of the tape is considered to be a "publica-
tion," for federal copyright protection is available both for published
and unpublished works. Thus it may develop that the broad preemption
issue, the issue left open by the Supreme Court in Sears and Compco,
may not have to be reached because statutory copyright protection is
after all available to the broadcaster.
Several courts have already considered these questions since the
Supreme Court's decision. Probably the most significant case is the
'Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in the first major community
antenna TV case.267 The case originated as an antitrust suit brought
by the CATV proprietor against the network station which had ex-
clusive broadcasting rights for a section of Idaho. The station counter-
claimed and requested an injunction on grounds of unfair competition
and "tortious interference" under state law. The district court, prior
2 64 Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Haxv. L. REv. 888, 943-44 (1964) ;
compare Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937),
with RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
265 Cf. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 446-47
(1963) (concurring opinion).
266 See Fritch, Some Copyright Implications of Videotapes, 37 So. CAL. L. Rev. 214
(1964).
267 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964),
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to Sears and Compco, granted relief on the counterclaim.20 8 The court
of appeals reversed, after the Supreme Court's decisions, 0 9 holding that
unless the TV station could show that its interests were protected by
the copyright laws, or could invoke "some other recognized exception
to the policy promoting free access to all matter in the public domain,"
no relief could be granted on the counterclaim 70 In this counterclaim,
the court of appeals found precisely that use of state unfair competition
law that the Sears and Compco decisions had foreclosed.2  Since neither
deception nor passing off had been alleged as the basis of the unfair
competition, the counterclaim simply duplicated the protections theoreti-
cally afforded by the federal statutory scheme.
Since the Ninth Circuit's decision there have been two other cases,
both in New York. The first of these involved an unauthorized use,
for -the production of a commercial phonograph record, of CBS news
commentator Allan Jackson's moving report of the death of President
Kennedy. Jackson and the network both sued the recording company,
seeking damages and an injunction for alleged infringement of common-
law copyright and for unfair competition. The court granted relief on
both grounds. 22 Both Sears-Compco and the community antenna TV
case were distinguished, easily on the copyright count, and on the unfair
competition count only after finding evidence of the very kind of
deception or passing off that had been lacking in the earlier cases.
The other New York case went off on uncertain procedural
grounds.2 7 8 But the court did recognize that in -the absence of any
copyright claim, deception or passing off must be shown to bring the
268 211 F. Supp. 47 (D. Idaho 1962).
269 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964). Sears and Compco were decided in March; Cable
Vision in mid-July of 1964.
270 335 F.2d at 354."
271 The court stressed the narrowing effect of Sears and Compco on the state law of
unfair competition: "Save for the limited protection accorded the creator of literary
and intellectual works under the Copyright Act or its exceptions . . . anyone may freely
and with impunity avail himself of such works to any extent he may desire and for any
purpose whatever subject only to the qualification that he does not steal goodwill, or,
perhaps more accurately stated, deceive others in thinking the creations represent his own
work." 335 F.2d at 351.
272 CBS v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup.
Ct. 1964); cf. King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But cf.
Bupp v. Great Western Broadcasting Corp., 201 Cal. App. 2d 580, 20 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962),
refusing damages for a TV station's use during a strike of videotaped announcements
recorded for the station by the plaintiff announcer prior to the strike.
27-3Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254
N.Y.S.2d 36 (1964). The court refused to enjoin alleged misappropriation of exclusive
rights claimed by the plaintiffs to license the showing of certain movies on television. For
an early discussion of this problem, see Silverberg, Televising Old Films-Some New Legal
Questions About Performers' and Proprietors' Rights, 38 VA. L. Rlv. 615 (1952).
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case within that segment of unfair competition law that survived the
Sears and Compco decisions. That is where the matter rests for the
moment.
CONCLUSION
It is still too early -to judge the net effect upon the broadcaster of
the convergence of these two major lines of legal development. At most,
it can confidently be stated that both are profoundly important for the
radio and television industry. On the one hand, the character of tort
litigation affecting the broadcaster is changing, and appears to be in-
creasingly threatening. Invasion of privacy and competitive tort suits
are bound to become more important, whether or not defamation
diminishes in significance. On the other hand, the broadcaster's claim
for at least partial immunity under federal law never rested on a firmer
legal foundation. Both the first amendment and the Communications
Act, in quite distinct ways, suggest many situations in which new
defenses may be available to the broadcaster. What these developments
underscore is a need. for careful analysis, especially of the relationship
of the two lines of cases to one another. On the basis of such analysis,
there may be fruitful possibilities for new legislation. At the very
least, the problems that are likely to come before the courts in the next
decade may be more clearly understood.
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